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Legal Techniques for Dealing
with Scientific Uncertainty in
Environmental Law
Jorge E. Vinuales*

ABSTRACT

This Article analyzes how scientific uncertainty is handled
in international environmental law. It identifies ten legal
techniques used for this purpose (i.e., precautionary reasoning;
framework-protocol approach; advisory scientific bodies; lawmaking by treaty bodies; managerialapproaches to compliance;
prior informed consent; environmental impact assessment and
monitoring; provisional measures; evidence; and facilitated
liability) and links them to four different stages of development
design,
advocacy,
(i.e.,
regimes
environmental
of
implementation, and reparation). These techniques are
illustrated by reference to some fifteen environmental treaties
and other instruments as well as through a detailed case study
focusing on the climate change regime.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the modern inception of international environmental law
(IEL) in the late 1960s, proponents of international regulation of
environmental issues have struggled against scientific uncertainty
and economic hostility. From a political standpoint, these two
obstacles often have been closely related, as economic hostility has
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heavily relied upon the considerable scientific uncertainty underlying
most environmental challenges at different stages of their
understanding and recognition to downplay the legitimacy of
environmental regulation. The historical development of the climate
change regime provides perhaps the most prominent illustration of
this latter point.'
However,
even
when considered
objectively,
scientific
uncertainty remains a major obstacle to the elaboration of efficient
environmental regulation. Whether it is to gain momentum for the
introduction of such regulation, to design a resilient regulatory
system, or to ensure its effective implementation or the reparation of
breaches, scientific uncertainty raises daunting challenges. One
interesting avenue to addressing these challenges has been the
development of a number of legal techniques that deal with scientific
uncertainty. Such legal techniques include a broad array of rules,
principles, and mechanisms grounded in IEL that provide guidance
on the steps to be taken at different stages of the development of an
international regime facing scientific uncertainty. In order to better
understand the operation of such techniques, it is important to
specify further the contours of the challenges scientific uncertainty
raises.
In his seminal work, published in 1921,2 the economist Frank
Knight introduced an important distinction between uncertainty and
risk. Knight famously noted that
Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the
familiar notion of Risk, from which it has never been properly
separated.... The essential fact is that "risk" means in some cases a
quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is
something distinctly not of this character; and there are far-reaching
and crucial differences in the bearings of the phenomenon depending on
which of the two is really present and operating. . .. It will appear that
a measurable uncertainty, or "risk" proper, as we shall use the term, is
so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an
3
uncertainty at all.

Thus, Knight uses the term "uncertainty" to refer to cases in which
the probability of alternative future scenarios cannot be determined,
whereas the term "risk" is left for cases where the relative
probabilities of alternative future scenarios can be determined
(quantified) and at least one of those scenarios is undesirable. 4 In the
context of environmental regulation, the term uncertainty normally
applies to (1) the initial identification of a phenomenon; (2) the

1.
See SPENCER R. WEART, THE DISCOVERY OF GLOBAL WARMING ch. 7-9 (rev.
& expanded ed. 2008) (discussing the political history of climate change and the
corresponding skepticism).
2.

FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921).

3.
4.

Id. at 19-20 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 233-34.
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increasing understanding of the processes that govern it; (3) the
forecast of its likely consequences, whether positive or negative; and,
as the case may be, (4) the processes that can be triggered to manage
it.
It is unclear at which particular point the uncertainty
surrounding a given phenomenon is sufficiently dissipated for that
phenomenon to become a risk. Intuitively, one may consider that the
more the predictability of a given phenomenon increases and its
implications are understood (i.e., once step (3) is reached), the better
one can circumscribe and address the potential risk arising from that
phenomenon.
To take again the example of climate change, the research on
climate change was initially intended to explain prehistoric ice ages
(or climate modification for military purposes) rather than future
global warming,5 and, for a long time, it was unable to determine
with any accuracy the relative probability of alternative future
scenarios. 6 It was only with the advent and subsequent refinement of
computer models that global warming technically became a risk.7
The policy actions accompanying the move from scientific uncertainty
to the recognition of risk followed a recognizable pattern that shifted
from the increasing allocation of research funds to the actual
adoption of mitigation and adaptation measures. As this Article will
discuss, most of the legal techniques that have been developed in IEL
focus on risks (i.e., partial scientific uncertainty) rather than on
uncertainty-even those that come into play at early stages of regime
development.
The purpose of this Article is to survey several examples from
IEL in order to map the techniques currently available, link them to
each stage of regime development, and then discuss their operation in
practice. After a brief discussion of the concept of international
regimes and their dynamics (Part II), this Article analyzes a number
of legal techniques used to deal with scientific uncertainty at different
stages of development of international environmental regimes (Part
III) and then explores the operation of some of the techniques
surveyed in the context of the climate change regime (CCR) (Part IV).

5.
See WEART, supra note 1, chs. 1-2 (discussing early research and its
various purposes).
6.
Id. ch. 6 (explaining that at that time, the climate appeared "less like a
simple mechanical system than like a confused beast that a dozen different forces were
prodding in different directions").
7.
Id. (discussing the progression of computer modeling for climate change
research); see generally Working Group I, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, 4 I.P.C.C. ASSESSMENT REP. 1
(Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT] (explaining
the use of computer models throughout a discussion of climate change science).
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AND REGIME DEVELOPMENT

A. The Theory of Regimes
Both political scientists and international lawyers know well the
theory of regimes.8 This survey therefore is limited to only those
concepts that provide the basic structure underlying the analysis
conducted in the following Parts.
The context in which regime theory emerged considerably
influenced its theoretical premises. In the aftermath of the Second
World War, a controversy arose between international legal scholars
and political scientists regarding the effectiveness and even the very
This controversy lasted three
existence of international law. 9
10
this
context,
the
theory
of regimes appeared as an
decades.
In
attempt to provide political grounding to international law or, as
noted by one commentator, as an attempt to "[r]einvent[]
international law in rational choice language.""
A classical work on regime theory by Stephen Krasner defines a
regime as "[a set] of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision making procedures around which actors' expectations

8.

ET AL.,

For useful surveys of regime theory, see DAVID ARMSTRONG

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ch. 3 (2007) (discussing various
theories of international relations); ANDREAS HASENCLEVER ET AL., THEORIES OF
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (2000); INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

29-39 (Beth A. Simmons & Richard H. Steinberg eds., 2006); REGIME THEORY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993). Some of the most influential
work on this topic took environmental regimes as the starting-point. See, e.g., ORAN R.
YOUNG, GOVERNANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS (1999) (presenting the current status and

future prospects of regime theory as a way of thinking about governance in world
affairs); ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR
NATURAL

RESOURCES AND

THE

ENVIRONMENT

(1989)

(exploring

ways

to

study

international regimes, offering a more precise definition of international regime, and
considering historico-political dynamics affecting the ability of nations to implement
international agreements through case studies for four international environmental
issues). Other schools of international relations theory have criticized the theory of
regimes. Kyle W. Danish, InternationalRelations Theory, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 205, 207-19 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds.,

2007). Realists have argued that regimes are mere faqades hiding power politics. Id. at
207-08. Liberalists have challenged the use of the state as the analytical unit in
regime theory. Id. at 213-15. Constructivists have argued that regime theory does not
sufficiently take into account that institutions may shape the preferences of actors over
time, and therefore, preferences should not be regarded as purely exogenous variables.
Id. at 215-19.
9.
See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993) (giving an account of
this controversy).
10.
Id. at 219.
11.
Id. at 220. Or as Robert Keohane, a political scientist, puts it: "political
scientists have 'discovered' what to lawyers seems obvious: rules structure politics."

Robert 0. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38
HARv. INT'L L.J. 487, 488 (1997).
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This
converge in a given area of international relations."12
characterization certainly raises further questions about the
definition of its main components. Krasner explains the meaning of
those components as follows:
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are
standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules
are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making
procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing
13
collective choice.

A more detailed understanding of these concepts calls for some
additional comments.
First, "regimes must be understood as
something more than temporary arrangements" or agreements that
govern particular ad hoc questions based on short-term calculations
of interest. 14 Regimes are only relevant if there exists "some sense of
general obligation,"15 which could be compared (although not simply
equated) to the legal concept of opinio juris.16
A second observation concerns the basic distinction between
principles and norms on the one hand, and rules and procedures on
the other. The normative dimension or "sense of general obligation"
is found above all in principles and norms.' 7 Only principles and
norms provide the basic defining characteristics of a regime. Rules
and procedures also enjoy some degree of normativity, but they have
a hierarchically lower position in that "[t]here may be many rules and
decision-making procedures that are consistent with the same

12.
Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:Regimes
as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed.,
1983).
Id.
13.
14.
Id. at 2-3.
15.
Id. at 3.
16.
See Josef L. Kunk, The Nature of Customary InternationalLaw, 47 AM. J.
IN'L L. 662, 665-68 (1953) (explaining the concept of opinio juris and its role in
international law); Paul Guggenheim, L'origine de la notion de al'opinio juris sive
necessitatiso comme deuxidme dliment de la coutume dans l'histoire du droit des gens,
in Hommage d'une g~ndration du juristes au Pr6sident Basdevant 258 (1960)
[Allors que pour Puchta et Savigny l'opinio juris sive necessitates 6tait
l'expression immanente de l'dme du peuple, pour la th6orie du droit
international-qui s'inspsire ici des civilistes--1'61ment psychologique de la
coutume, tel qu'on 1'entend commun6ment, se rattache directement A l'usage et
consiste chez ceux qui le pratiquent dans le sentiment qu'ils agissent en vertu
d'une rbgle reconnue comme norme juridique.
In the words of Krasner, "[i]t is the infusion of behavior with principles and norms that
distinguishes regime-governed activity in the international system from more
conventional activity, guided exclusively by narrow calculations of interest." Krasner,
supra note 12, at 3.
17.
Krasner, supra note 12, at 2 ("Norms are standards of behavior defined in
terms of rights and obligations.").
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principles and norms."1 8 That said, it is often difficult to distinguish
rules from norms, and it seems more realistic to think of a regime as
a set of "injunctions of greater or lesser specificity."' 9
Third, the manner in which international regimes influence state
behavior is not entirely clear. There are three basic views on the
issue of regime significance. One view is that no pattern of behavior
can last without generating a congruent regime. 20 Another view is
that only political and economic power relations are relevant to
understand international politics, so the concept of regimes is a mere
fagade.2 1 A third (intermediate) position holds that international
regimes can play a considerable role in structuring state behavior but
only under certain restrictive conditions.2 2
Thus characterized, the concept of regime has been a powerful
analytical tool in both political science and international law
literature. Although international lawyers are somewhat reluctant to
use the concept in its technical meaning, their writings often refer to

18.
Id. at 3. Extrapolating some of the concepts of systems theory, Krasner says
that "[c]hanges in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within regimes,"
id. at 3, whereas "[cihanges in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself,"
id. at 4.
19.
ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 59 (1984). Keohane notes:
Some [of these injunctions] are far-reaching and extremely important. They
may change only rarely. At the other extreme, injunctions may be merely
technical, matters of convenience that can be altered without great political or
economic impact. In-between are injunctions that are both specific enough that
violations of them are in principle identifiable and that changes in them can be
observed, and sufficiently significant that changes in them make a difference
for the behavior of actors and the nature of the international political economy.
It is these intermediate injunctions-politically consequential but specific
enough that violations and changes can be identified-that I take as the
essence of international regimes.

Id.
20.
Krasner, supra note 12, at 1 (citing Donald J. Puchala & Raymond F.
Hopkins, InternationalRegimes: Lessons From Inductive Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES, supranote 12, at 61; Oran R. Young, Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of
InternationalRegimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 12, at 93).
21.
See Susan Strange, Cave! hic Dragones: A Critique of Regimes Analysis, in
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 12, at 337 (arguing that regime characteristics,
such as principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures, do not have a
significant role in international relations).
22.
Krasner, supra note 12, at 1-2. This was the dominant position at the time
of Krasner's work and was represented by the contributions of Arthur Stein, Robert
Keohane, Robert Jervis and also, although to a lesser extent, by those of John Ruggie,
Charles Lipson and Benjamin Cohen. Id. It should be noted that the literature on
regimes has since that time evolved towards a more liberal perspective, which analyzes
the impact of international institutions on State behavior. See Oran R. Young,
InternationalRegimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions, 39 WORLD POL. 104, 10405 (1986) (reviewing regime theory literature and noting an increasing interest in the
significance of international institutions).
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regimes in a broader sense (such as a treaty framework or a sub-field)
that largely overlaps with the technical meaning.2 3
B. Regime Development
One important contribution of the literature on regimes has been
to provide a conceptual framework for the analysis of international
institutions as they emerge and evolve over time. Currently, the
concept of dynamic regimes-or in the words of Thomas Gehring,
"dynamic environmental treaty systems"-is well established in both
legal and political science literature focusing on IEL.24 The origins of
the current understanding can be traced back to the seminal works of
Oran Young.
In an article published in 1982, which he later refined in a
subsequent work, Young noted that "[tihe fact that international
regimes are complex social institutions makes it tempting to
approach them in static terms, abstracting them from the impact of
time and social change."2 5 But if a regime is to operate as intended,
its dynamics cannot be overlooked. Young, therefore, presented an
orderly analysis of two aspects of these dynamics, namely the
patterns of "regime formation" (emergence of social institutions) and
the variables explaining "regime transformation" ("significant
alterations in a regime's structures of rights and rules, the character
of its social choice mechanisms, and the nature of its compliance

23.
On the use of the "special regimes" concept, see Int'l Law Comm'n, Study
Group, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, § 14.3(11)-(12), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.702 (July 18, 2006) (defining special regimes and distinguishing three types)
and Int'l Law Comm'n, Study Group, Fragmentationof InternationalLaw: Difficulties
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of InternationalLaw, paras. 8, 123-93,
U.N. Doc. A/CN4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) (discussing
the scope and limits of this concept).
24.
Thomas Gehring, Treaty-Making and Treaty Evolution, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 8,

at 467, 468

(defining such systems as "issue-specific institutional structures that are purposively
established, and maintained, by their member states to govern specific areas of
international environmental relations"); see also THOMAS GEHRING, DYNAMIC
INTERNATIONAL

REGIMES:

INSTITUTIONS

FOR

INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

GOVERNANCE (1994) (F.R.G.) (discussing international environmental regimes as
"dynamic institutions for international governance in rapidly changing issue-areas");
George W. Downs et al., The TransformationalModel of InternationalRegime Design:
Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 465 (1999) (discussing
the merits and criticisms of international treaty regimes designed according to the
Transformational Approach).

25.

Oran R. Young, Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International

Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 277, 278 (1982); see also YOUNG,
("International regimes do not operate in a social vacuum.").

supra note 8, at 8

2010/

SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

445

mechanisms"). 26 Regarding the former, Young argued that there are
three types of orders, according to their different formation paths:
spontaneous orders, negotiated orders, and imposed orders. 2 7 As to
the forces guiding regime transformation, the author referred to
three: internal contradictions, shifts in underlying power structures,
and exogenous forces. 2 8
The distinction between regime formation and transformation,
as well as some of the more specific concepts attached to these stages
of a regime's life, are particularly relevant for our purpose, as they
provide a set of basic categories to structure the analysis in the
following sections. In this regard, each of the two stages Young
identified can be further subdivided into two additional stages.
Thus, in the formation of negotiated regimes-namely those
characterized "by conscious efforts to agree on their major provisions,
explicit consent on the part of individual participants, and formal
expression of the results" 29-this
Article further distinguishes
between an advocacy stage (Stage One) and a design stage (Stage
Two). Stage One covers efforts aimed at advocating for a regime
despite the uncertainties or (at best) the insufficiently understood
risks relating to a given issue. Stage Two encompasses efforts at
designing an international regime that can deal with scientific and
technological changes. For Young, those changes can be viewed as
exogenous forces or, in other words, as "societal developments
external to a specific regime (treated as one among many social
institutions) [which] may lead to alterations in human behavior that
undermine the essential elements of the regime."30 In order to avoid
those forces rendering an international regime partially or totally
obsolete, regimes that are developed to tackle issues characterized by
considerable uncertainty can incorporate mechanisms to avoid
obsolescence.
Regarding regime transformation, the focus here will be on how
international regimes can subsist without becoming scientifically or
technologically obsolete.
This Article will therefore use the
expression "regime implementation," which is more adapted to refer
to those techniques that help manage regime stress from scientific
and technological changes. It will further distinguish between two
additional stages, one focusing on how uncertainties are managed in
the implementation of a regime (Stage Three) and the other on how

26.
Young, supra note 25, at 291.
27.
Id. at 282-85.
28.
Id. at 291-95.
29.
Id. at 283.
30.
Id. at 294. See generally EUGENE B. SKOLNIKOFF, THE ELUSIVE
TRANSFORMATION: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1994) (extensively examining the importance of science and technology in
international affairs).
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they are retrospectively handled in case a risk materializes (Stage
Four). In simpler terms, Stage Three covers activities such as
monitoring, updating and compliance, whereas Stage Four focuses on
reparation for damages.
The foregoing considerations are summarized in Table I:
TABLE
Regime
formation
Regime
implementation

I: STAGES

OF REGIME DEVELOPMENT

Stage 1:

Advocating the need for a regime despite
uncertainty
Designing a regime dealing with uncertainty
in regime
Dealing with uncertainty
implementation
Dealing with uncertainty in reparation

Stage 2:
Stage 3:
Stage 4:

The following Parts provide a survey of a number of legal
techniques that have been developed in IEL to tackle risk and
uncertainty at different stages of the development of an international
regime.
III. TACKLING SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY IN THEORY:
LEGAL TECHNIQUES USED IN IEL

A. Overview of the Techniques
The legal techniques that have been mobilized to deal with
scientific uncertainty in the field of IEL differ considerably as to their
nature, legal grounding and stage of intervention. Regarding their
nature, some of these techniques, such as precautionary reasoning or
the provisions on State or civil liability, could be understood as
principles, norms, or rules in the meaning specified above. Others,
such as the establishment of scientific and monitoring bodies or the
framework-protocol approach, are better described as decision
making processes or architectural features. Still others, such as the
international mechanisms on prior informed consent and prior impact
assessment, are somewhat between the two, as they impose both an
international obligation and a process.
These techniques also differ with respect to their legal
grounding. Whereas, for instance, the international rules on civil
liability of private operators3i can be linked to formal sources of

E.g., International Maritime Organization [IMO], International Convention
31.
on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, IMO Sales No. 1490M (Mar. 23,
2001) (making available compensation for persons who suffer damage caused by spills

2010]

SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

447

international law (treaty law), the legal grounding of precautionary
reasoning or of the rules on the international "liability" of the state
remains uncertain. 32
As to the stage of intervention of these techniques, whereas
some, such as precautionary reasoning, are likely to be mobilized
early in the process of regime development, others intervene later,
respectively at the design stage (such as the framework-protocol or
the establishment of advisory scientific bodies), the implementation
stage (law-making by treaty bodies, managerial approaches to
compliance, including monitoring and financial mechanisms, prior
informed consent, and prior impact assessment), or the reparation
stage (provisional measures, evidenciary techniques, and facilitated
liability). Of course, some techniques may have a broader scope of
relevance. For instance, precautionary reasoning operates not only to
gather momentum for the negotiation of a regime but also as an
argument guiding decisions at later stages of regime development,
including when it comes to evaluating state responsibility for
preventing environmental damage. Similarly, where advisory bodies
are design features, they deploy their activity at the implementation
stage. For these reasons, it seems useful for the sake of clarity to
discuss each technique at the stage where it is most characteristic.

of oil carried as fuel in a ship's bunker); International Convention on Liability and
Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious
Substances by Sea, May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1406 (creating strict liability for shipowners
and a fund to provide additional compensation for damage caused by hazardous and
noxious substances); Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Paris Convention on Third
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Sept. 21, 1988, 1672 U.N.T.S. 301
(linking the Paris and Vienna conventions to bring together the geographical scope of
the two); International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29,
1969, 9 I.L.M. 45 (placing liability for oil pollution damage caused by maritime
casualties involving oil-carrying ships on the owners of the ships); Vienna Convention
on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 727 (creating civil
liability for operators for damage caused by nuclear energy); Brussels Convention on
Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, available at
http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nlbrussels.html (supplementing the Paris Convention on
Nuclear Liability by providing additional funds to compensate damage as a result of
nuclear incidents); Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25,
1962, reprinted in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1963) (providing strict liability of operators of
nuclear ships for damage caused by the nuclear fuel of or radioactive products
produced by the ship); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960,
1519 U.N.T.S. 329 (defining and regulating liability and compensation for damage
caused by accidents occurring while producing nuclear energy).
32.
See Owen McIntyre & Thomas Mosedale, The PrecautionaryPrincipleas a
Norm of Customary InternationalLaw, 9 J. ENvTL. L. 221, 223 (1997) ("[Djue to the
fact that it has appeared in a variety of forms, the precise content of the obligation
[using the precautionary approach] . . . remains a matter of uncertainty."); discussion
infra Part III.B.10 (covering Facilitated Liability).
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Table II provides an overview of the main legal techniques
operating at each stage of regime development:
TABLE II: LEGAL TECHNIQUES FOR DEALING WITH
SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY
Stage 1: Advocacy

Precautionary reasoning

Stage 2: Design

Framework-protocol approach
Advisory scientific bodies

Stage 3: Implementation

Law-making by treaty bodies
Managerial approaches to compliance
Prior informed consent (PIC)
Environmental impact assessment and
monitoring

Stage 4: Reparation

Provisional measures
Evidence
Facilitated liability

What follows is an analysis of both these techniques and the manner
in which they operate at their corresponding stage of regime
development.
B. Analysis of Individual Techniques
1.

Precautionary Reasoning3 3

Precautionary reasoning can intervene in different forms, from a
mere adage ("better safe than sorry") to a general approach (as
advocated by the United States) to a principle or even a rule shifting
the burden of proof.34 Such diversity of forms stems from the fact
that precaution is a multi-layered concept, involving both a broad

33.
On precaution, see ARIE TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002); INTERPRETING THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Timothy O'Riordan & James Cameron eds., 1994) (Eng.);
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE CHALLENGE OF
IMPLEMENTATION (David Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996) (Neth.).
34.
See Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 8, at 597, 602-06 (discussing three
versions of the precuationary principle). For a detailed discussion of the different
meanings that can be ascribed to the precautionary principle, see Daniel Bodansky,
Deconstructingthe PrecautionaryPrinciple,in BRINGING NEW LAW TO OCEAN WATERS
381-91 (David D. Caron & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 2004), and Per Sandin, Dimensions
of the PrecautionaryPrinciple,5 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 889, 889-907
(1999).
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consensual meaning and more specific controversial ones. It is hard
to disagree with the adage that it is better to prevent the occurrence
of disaster than to deal with it once it has occurred. But when one
tries to move beyond this broad meaning to more operational
characterizations of precaution, controversy becomes the rule.3 5
This is not to say that operational characterizations of
precaution have not been accepted in international law or in
international decisions. In fact, it appears in many national and
international instruments, although in different forms, 36 and in a
number of decisions from adjudicatory bodies.37 Commentators have
identified a number of "legal functions" deployed by precaution and,
more specifically, by the precautionary principle. Bodansky refers to
the following three functions: (1) to exclude certain justifications
(such as scientific uncertainty) for inaction; (2) to justify otherwise
questionable action; and (3) to require action.3 8 He also offers several
illustrations of these functions. Function (1) is embodied in the broad
injunction made in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, which states that "lack of scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures."3 9 This idea also appears in a number of international
instruments, including the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Article 3.3),40 the Stockholm Convention
on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POP Convention) (Article 8.7(a)) 41
or the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (Preamble). 42 The
Biosafety Protocol to this latter convention goes a step further and
provides an illustration of function (2). Indeed, Article 11.8 of this
protocol states:

See Christopher D. Stone, Is There a PrecautionaryPrinciple?, [2001] 31
35.
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,790, 10,790-10,799 (July 2001) (discussing the
contents of the precautionary principle).

36.
See David VanderZwaag, The Precautionary Principle in Environmental
Law and Policy: Elusive Rhetoric and FirstEmbraces, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAc. 355, 36061 (1999) (noting examples of definitional variations of the precautionary principles
between international instruments).
37.

See PATRIcIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT

159-64 & nn.298-330 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing the legal status of the precautionary
principle).
38.
Bodansky, supra note 34, at 383-86.
39.
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June

3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 15, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26(Vol.I) (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
40.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3.3, May 9,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
41.
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants art. 8.7(a), May 22,
2001, 40 I.L.M. 532 [hereinafter Stockholm Convention].
42.
Convention on Biological Diversity pmbl., June 29, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S.
143, 31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter CBD].

450

VANDERBILT/OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOt, 43:-437

Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific
information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential
adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking
also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party
from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of that
living modified organism intended for direct use as food or feed, or for
processing, in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse
43
effects.

This provision echoes the trade dispute between the United States
and the European Community, usually referred to as Beef Hormones,
where the latter unsuccessfully sought to justify import restrictions of
US beef on the basis of the precautionary principle.44 The same
problem may arise in the area of foreign investment, when the
activities of a foreign investor are restricted by the host state on
precautionary environmental grounds. 45 An even stricter version of
the precautionary principle, illustrating function (3), is found in
Article 3(2) of the 1992 Baltic Sea Convention, pursuant to which
states
shall apply the precautionary principle, i.e., to take preventive
measures when there is reason to assume that substances or energy
introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine environment may
create hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine
ecosystems, damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of
the sea even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal
46
relationship between inputs and their alleged effects.

The functions Bodansky identified and the examples reviewed tend to
focus on already existing international regimes. They nevertheless
remain relevant for the analysis of how precautionary reasoning may
intervene before a regime has emerged. Indeed, in many cases,
precautionary reasoning appears in framework conventions, which

43.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
art. 11, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027, available at http://www.cbd.int/
dodlegal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf [hereinafter Biosafety Protocol].
44.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning

Meat and Meat Products, at 7, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998)
(adopted Feb. 13, 1998).

45.

See, e.g., Jorge E. Vinuales, Access to Water in Foreign Investment Disputes,

21 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 733 (2009) (discussing the potential conflict of interest
between a State's obligation to provide access to water and the rights of foreign
investors under international investment law); see, e.g., Jorge E. Vinuales, Conflits

normatifs en droit international: Normes environnementales vs. protection des
investissements, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL FACE AUX ENJEUX ENVIRONNEMENTAUX
407, at 420-424 (SFDI ed., 2010) (Fr.) (discussing states' invocation of environmental
considerations in regulating the actions of foreign investors).
46.
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea
Area art. 3, para. 2, Apr. 9, 1992, 2099 U.N.T.S. 197, available at http://www.helcom.fil
Convention/enGB/text/.
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need to be supplemented by more specific regulations to actually
become a regime. In these cases, precautionary reasoning will help
gather momentum for such more specific rules and processes to
develop-or at least for increasing research efforts which, in turn,
will catalyze the development of such rules and processes. The
example of the climate change regime will be discussed later in this
Article. Here, the focus is on the issue of biosafety within the more
general framework of the biodiversity regime.
Throughout the 1970s, with the advances in bioengineering
technologies, the economic potential of biodiversity as a natural
resource (later called "biological resources") became increasingly
clear.4 7
Developing countries, far richer in biodiversity than
industrialized states, soon came to realize the importance of taking
control of these resources.
Within the context of the efforts
undertaken since the early 1980s to elaborate an umbrella convention
to provide coherence to several wildlife and habitat conventions
already in existence, developing countries started to advocate for the
regulation of the uses of biodiversity and biotechnology. 48 This view,
initially embodied in a project elaborated under the aegis of the
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) in the late 1980s,
eventually prevailed in the negotiations towards the adoption in 1992
of the CBD, which reflects a rather utilitarian view of biodiversity
somewhat between protection and exploitation. 49 Throughout the
1990s, the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) led to
increasing economic tensions between the United States, the largest
user of GMO crops, and a number of European States that imported
U.S. products, in a context of scientific uncertainty as to the potential
risks entailed by GMOs. 50 Although, to date, such risks have yet to

47.
See CBD, supra note 42 (referring to the importance of conserving the
"biological resources" of the parties throughout the convention).
48.
Convention on Biological Diversity, History of the Convention,
http://www.cbd.int/history/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
49.
See ALEXANDRE CHARLES KISS & JEAN-PIERRE BEURIER, DROIT
INTERNATIONAL DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT 366, para. 729 (3d ed. 2004) (Fr.)

La protection et l'utilisation de la biodiversit6 d6coulent de leur comp6tence sur
toute 1'6tendue de leur territoire et mime sur les zones marines sous leur
juridiction. En contrepartie, les 6tats sont responsables de la conservation et
de l'utilisation durable de ces ressources. Ainsi la convention confirme la
qualification de la diversit6 biologique comme une ressource economique.

50.

See Genetically Modified Organisms Still Source of US-EU Tension,

GLOBALIZATION 101, July 28, 2003, http://www.globalizationl01.org/news1/GMOs
(discussing the European Union's 1998 moratorium that effectively banned GMOs and
the tension that it caused with the U.S. by restricting the import of U.S. GMO
products).

452

VANDERBIL T]OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 431437

be proved,5 ' the European Community and a number of developing
countries prompted the adoption of a protocol to the CBD on a
precautionary basis, namely the Biosafety Protocol (also known as the
Cartagena Protocol). 52 Article 1 of the Protocol stresses this fact by
making an express reference to the precautionary principle as
formulated in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.5 3 The relations
between the Biosafety Protocol and international trade law have
come under close scrutiny, specifically with respect to the status of
the precautionary principle in international law, as a result of a case
decided in 2006 by a WTO panel regarding measures taken by the
European Community against biotechnology products. 54
2.

Framework-protocol Approach55

The need for the progressive completion of international
environmental regimes discussed in the foregoing subpart has been
recognized since the early days of environmental regulation. 56 The
pace of such completion and refinement is given by the evolving
political consensus of member states, which is in turn considerably
influenced by progress in the scientific understanding of the relevant
environmental issues.5 7
A recurrent legal technique in this regard is the use of a
framework-protocol approach. This approach clearly illustrates the
different levels at which operate the components of a regime.
Framework conventions provide for broad principles and norms and
for an institutional architecture for the subsequent development of

51.
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE 2003-04: AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: MEETING THE NEEDS OF THE
POOR? 58-72, 76 (2004).

52.
Biosafety Protocol, supra note 43.
53.
Id. art. 1.
54.
European Communities-MeasuresAffecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WTf/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) (adopted
Nov. 21, 2006).
55.
On this topic, see Christian Dominic6, Observations sur le recours t la
convention-cadre en matidre environnementale, in PACTE, CONVENTION, CONTRAT:
M9LANGES EN L'HONNEUR DU PROFESSEUR BRUNO SCHMIDLIN 249-59 (1998) (Fr.);
Laurence R. Helfer, Nonconsensual InternationalLawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 71,
82-86, 112-17 (2008).
56.
See Peter H. Sand, Evolution of Environmental Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 8, at 33-34 (noting
that the first U.N. Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 focused on
producing an international institution for environmental protection activities within
functional international regimes).
57.
See Steinar Andresen & Jon Birger Skjerseth, Science and Technology:
From Agenda Setting to Implementation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 8, at 182-202 (discussing the
influence of scientific progress on policy-making).
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the regime, while protocols (as well as decisions by Conferences of the
Parties (COP), discussed below) embody the more specific rules and
decision making procedures necessary for the implementation of the
regime.
There are different approaches to the use of protocols.58 Among
these are approaches that are based on a framework convention and
intended to spell out and implement the principles and norms set out
in such convention or a section thereof. Examples of this approach in
the field of IEL include, inter alia, the protocols to the 1979
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the 1987
Montreal Protocol (as subsequently adjustedlamended) to the Vienna
Convention on the Ozone Layer, or the Kyoto Protocol to the
UNFCCC. The scope of the relations between such protocols and the
underlying convention varies from case to case, and may be specified
in the convention, the protocol, or both. For instance, most provisions
of the Vienna Convention on the Ozone Layer expressly refer to
potential future protocols. The relations between the Convention and
the protocols are based, in essence, on the lex specialis principle, as
specified in several of the Convention's provisions. 59 This point is
confirmed by Article 14 of the Montreal Protocol, which provides that
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Protocol, the provisions of the
Convention relating to its protocols shall apply to this Protocol."
More importantly for the purpose of our discussion, protocols are
expressly intended to incorporate new scientific and technological
data. The Preamble of the Vienna Convention referred to "the need
for further research and systematic observations to further develop
scientific knowledge of the ozone layer and possible adverse effects
resulting from its modification" and the general obligations appearing
in Article 2 of the Convention (which in turn refers to obligations
arising from protocols) are qualified by Article 2(4), pursuant to
which "[t]he application of this article shall be based on relevant
scientific and technical considerations. "60 The relationship between
scientific progress and regulation underlying these provisions

See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, TRAINING MANUAL ON
58.
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 3, para. 17 (2006) (listing four different

instruments that are covered by the term "protocol").
E.g., Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer art. 9(2),
59.
Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1516 ("The text of any proposed amendment to this
Convention or to any protocol, except as may otherwise be provided in such protocol,
shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six months before the
meeting at which it is proposed for adoption."); id. art. 10(2) ("Except as may be
otherwise provided in any protocol with respect to its annexes, the following procedure
shall apply to the proposal, adoption and entry into force of additional annexes to this
Convention or of annexes to a protocol."); id. art. 11(6) ("The provisions of this Article
[Settlement of disputes] shall apply with respect to any protocol except as provided in
the protocol concerned.").
Id. art. 2(4).
60.

454

VANDERBIL T/OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 43:437

appears more clearly in light of the critical advances that occurred
between the signature of the Vienna Convention and the adoption of
the Montreal Protocol. 61 Since the mid-1970s there had been a
controversy over the destruction of ozone in the stratosphere. A
British team eventually discovered the existence of a "hole" in the
ozone layer in 1985, and it was linked to emissions of
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). 62 This link became controversial, as
industrial groups sought to disprove that their products were
harmful. 63 However, the controversy was short-lived, as within two
years the scientific basis of the link between the emission of CFCs
and ozone depletion became solidly established. 64 Faced with these
scientific breakthroughs, States Party to the Vienna Convention had
little choice but to react through the adoption of the Montreal
Protocol, which specifically designated the substances to be subject to
control.65

3.

Advisory Scientific Bodies

Another design feature that focuses on the need for the
progressive completion of international environmental regimes as
scientific knowledge evolves is the establishment of advisory scientific
bodies by multilateral environmental treaties. Of course, such treaty
bodies also play an important role in the implementation of the
regime, as will be discussed later in this Article. Here, however, the
focus is on the inclusion of such a component in the design phase of
an international regime.
Advisory scientific bodies have been established in the context of
both older and more recent multilateral environmental treaties. Aside
from the one established by the UNFCCC, 66 other examples include

I follow here the discussion in WEART, supra note 1, at 147-48.
61.
Peter M. Morrisette, The Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric
62.
Ozone Depletion, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 793, 799 (1989).
63.
See Dominic6, supra note 55, at 251 (stressing the fact that at the time of
the conclusion of the Vienna Convention, the scientific aspects of the problem were still
subject to controversy).
64.
See Morrisette, supra note 62, at 799-800 (discussing the abundance of
scientific evidence linking CFCs to ozone depletion as of 1989, and noting that the
NASA Ozone Trends Panel had officially attributed the depletion to CFCs by that
time).
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Annex A,
65.
Sept. 6, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. The list of substances
initially identified in the Montreal Protocol has been regularly expanded by means of
adjustments and amendments made to this protocol. See United Nations Environment
of
the
Montreal
Protocol,
Ozone
Secretariat,
Evolution
Programme,
http://ozone.unep.org/Ratification-status/evolution-of mp.shtml (last visited Mar. 9,
2010) (discussing the history and change in the Protocol).
Article 9 of the UNFCCC states:
66.
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the committees established under the Ramsar Convention on
Wetlands of 1971,67 the regional Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP Convention) of 1979,68 the
CBD, 69 the Convention on Desertification, 70 the Convention on
Migratory Species, 7 ' and the POP Convention.7 2 Their function is as
a rule limited to the evaluation of scientific research conducted
outside of the treaty context and does not include the conduct of
primary research.73 They operate therefore both as an instrument for
staying abreast with scientific and technological progress and as a
sort of gatekeeper for the filtering of daunting amounts of information
produced by interest groups and, more generally, by the so-called
"epistemic communities." 74 The composition of such bodies is often

A subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice is hereby established
to provide the Conference of the Parties and, as appropriate, its other
subsidiary bodies with timely information and advice on scientific and
technological matters relating to the Convention. This body shall be open to
participation by all Parties and shall be multidisciplinary. It shall comprise
government representatives competent in the relevant field of expertise. It
shall report regularly to the Conference of the Parties on all aspects of its work.
UNFCC, supranote 40, art. 9(1).
67.
Conference of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Wetlands, Fifth
Meeting, Kushiro, Japan, June 9-16, 1993, Resolution 5.5: Establishment of a Scientific
and Technical Review Panel, available at http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/res/keyres_5.5e.pdf [hereinafter Resolution 5.5]. The Scientific and Technical Review Panel
(STRP), comprised of individual volunteer experts, was established in 1993 in order to
provide scientific and technical guidance to the convention's COP, Standing
Committee, and Secretariat. Id.
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution art. 10(3), Nov.
68.
13, 1979, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217 ("The Executive Body shall utilize the Steering Body for
the EMEP to play an integral part in the operation of the present Convention, in
particular with regard to data collection and scientific cooperation.").
69.
CBD, supra note 42, art. 25(1) ("A subsidiary body for the provision of
scientific, technical and technological advice is hereby established to provide the
Conference of the Parties and, as appropriate, its other subsidiary bodies with timely
advice relating to the implementation of this Convention.").
70.
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa art. 24(1),
June 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1328 [hereinafter UNCCD] ("A Committee on Science and
Technology is hereby established as a subsidiary body of the Conference of the Parties
to provide it with information and advice on scientific and technological matters
relating to combating desertification and mitigating the effects of drought.").
71.
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals art.
VIII(1), June 23, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 11 ("At its first meeting, the Conference of the Parties
shall establish a Scientific Council to provide advice on scientific matters.").
Stockholm Convention, supra note 41, art. 19(6) ("The Conference of the
72.
Parties shall, at its first meeting, establish a subsidiary body to be called the Persistent
Organic Pollutants Review Committee for the purposes of performing the functions
assigned to that Committee by this Convention.").
73.
Gehring, supra note 24, at 483.
74.
See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International
Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992) (defining advisory scientific bodies as
"network[s] of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular
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politically sensitive in that members are either party representatives
or party-nominated,75
and they must be geographically
representative.
4.

Law-making by Treaty BodieS76

Another important technique that intervenes at the level of both
regime completion and implementation is law-making by treaty

domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or
issue-area").
75.
See, e.g., UNFCCC, supra note 40, art. 9(1) (stating that the Subsidiary
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice consists of "government representatives
competent in the relevant field of expertise"). A similar composition is contemplated in
Article 25(1) of the CBD, supra note 42, for the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical
and Technological Advice, and in Article 24(1) of the UNCCD, supra note 70, for the
Committee on Science and Technology. Additionally, Article 19(6)(a) of the Stockholm
Convention, supra note 41, provides that the membership of the Persistent Organic
Pollutants Review Committee "shall consist of government-designated experts in
chemical assessment or management. The members of the Committee shall be
appointed on the basis of equitable geographical distribution." The members of the
Ramsar Scientific and Technical Review Panel are elected by the Standing Committee,
on the basis of nominations from the parties, on the same regional proportions used in
the composition of the Standing Committee. Conference of the Contracting Parties to
the Convention on Wetlands, 10th mtg., Changwon, S. Korea, Oct. 28-Nov. 4, 2008,
Resolution X.9: Refinements to the Modus Operandi of the Scientific & Technical Review
Panel, available at http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/res/key-res-x_09_ e.pdf. [hereinafter
Resolutation X9]; Conference of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on
Wetlands, 7th mtg., San Jose, Costa Rica, May 10-18, 1999, Resolution VII.2:
Composition and Modus Operandi of the Convention's Scientific and Technical Review
Panel, available at http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/res/ key res_vii.02e.pdf- Resolution 5.5,
supra note 67. They must be experts in the scientific areas required by the STRP's
work plan, Resolution X.9, supra, Annex, pt. IV, and they do not act as representatives
of their countries, id. app., para. 3. Resolution X9 establishes current modus operandi
and terms of reference applicable to the STRP. Id. Interestingly, in its paragraph 14,
this resolution acknowledges the importance of the input from external experts
(epistemic communities) for the work under the convention. Id. para. 14 ("[I]n other
work areas . . . the Panel shall seek additional expertise as and when required through
various means, including through collaboration with the scientific advisory bodies of
other international conventions and agencies, and through the International
Organization Partners, STRP invited observers, and STRP invited experts").
76.
For futher discussion of this issue, see Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of
InternationalGovernance: A Coming Challenge for InternationalEnvironmental Law?,
93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596 (1999); Jutta Brunde, COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under
MultilateralEnvironmental Agreements, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1 (2002) (Neth.); Robin
R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous InstitutionalArrangements in Multilateral
Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in InternationalLaw, 94 AM.
J. INT'L L. 623 (2000); Geir Ulfstein, Treaty Bodies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 8, at 877.
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As

Environmental treaty systems are designed to facilitate and speed up
the dynamic development of substantive regulations. Frequently,
obligations are tightened with growing scientific and technological
knowledge about a given problem and the gradual emergence of
78
suitable abatement strategies.

COPs are given law-making powers of varying scope by their
constituting instruments. These powers can focus on: (1) internal
regulations (essentially procedural, financial and administrative
rules); (2) substantive decision making (refinement of the substantive
obligations assumed by States Parties to the treaty); and (3) external
law making (cooperation and standard-setting).79 For purposes of the
analysis conducted in this Article, categories (1) and (2) are concerned
both with the design (refinement) and the implementation of a
regime, whereas category (3) focuses mainly on implementation.
Moreover, only categories (2) and (3) are directly relevant for dealing
with scientific uncertainty.
Regarding category (2), substantive decision making is important
for expanding the scope of the treaty obligations to respond to
scientific developments. Substantive decision making basically can
follow four avenues: amendments to the treaty; amendments to an
annex to the treaty; adoption of a protocol (or the amendment of its
text or its annexes); and a decision of the COP. The powers of COPs
vary from one avenue to the other. Less formal avenues (those that
do not require ratification by State Parties) have sometimes been
used to adopt controversial decisions.
An apposite example is Article 2.9(a)(1) of the Montreal Protocol,
which facilitates the "adjustment" of the ozone depleting potentials
(ODP) of the controlled substances appearing in Annex A of the
80
Protocol by way of a decision of the meeting of the parties.
Paragraphs (c) and (d) of this article specify that absent consensus,
such decisions can be adopted by a specific majority and are binding

See Gehring, supra note 24, at 479-81 (discussing the impact of
77.
administrative decisions by various treaty bodies on international law, such as filling
gaps in treaty law or adjusting to changed circumstances).
Id. at 468.
78.
79.
Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 76, at 625. Examples include adoption of
the rules of procedure, financial rules and the budget, exclusion or suspension of voting
rights, approval of credentials and appointments, admittance of observers, etc. Id. at
631. Churchill and Ulfstein speak of "external capacity" of COPs and other institutions
established by multilateral environmental treaties, namely their capacity to enter into
agreements with States (e.g., headquarter agreements), international organizations
(e.g., for the hosting of the MEA's secretariat), or financial institutions (e.g., in
connection with the Global Environmental Facility). Id. at 647-55.
Montreal Protocol, supranote 65, art. 2.9(a)(1).
80.

458

VANDERBIL T/OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 43:437

on all parties without need for ratification. 8 ' This procedure is
specifically aimed at keeping abreast of scientific advances, as stated
in Articles 2.9(a) and 6 and in Annex A of the Montreal Protocol. 82
Another more recent illustration of the use of COP decision
making powers for the updating of a regime is the decision by the
COP of the POP Convention, in May 2009, to include nine new
chemicals in the list of substances controlled by the Convention.
According to the advance report currently available, during the
discussions on the inclusion of these chemicals in the annexes to the
Convention, several representatives noted that "such inclusions
would highlight the dynamic nature of the Convention and draw
attention to its objective to protect human health and the
environment."8 3 It is interesting to note, in connection with the
discussion of advisory scientific bodies in the preceding section, that
the inclusion of these chemicals was based on the risk profile and risk
management evaluation conducted by POP Review Committee, a
scientific subsidiary body of the COP. 84
With respect to category (3), in recent times, increased attention
has been paid to the search for consistency in the work of different

81.
Id. art. 2.9(c)-(d). Art. 2.9(d) of the Montreal Protocol provides that "[t]he
decisions, which shall be binding on all Parties, shall forthwith be communicated to the
Parties by the Depositary. Unless otherwise provided in the decisions, they shall enter
into force on the expiry of six months from the date of the circulation of the
communication by the Depositary." Id. art. 2.9(d).
82.
Id. arts. 2.9(a), 6, Annex A. Art. 2.9(a) takes as the basis for adjustments
"the assessments made pursuant to Article 6." Id. art. 2.9(a). These assessments are
those conducted to keep abreast with scientific and techonological developments. Id.
art. 6.
Beginning in 1990, and at least every four years thereafter, the Parties shall
assess the control measures provided for in Article 2 and Articles 2A to 21 on
the basis of available scientific, environmental, technical and economic
information. At least one year before each assessment, the Parties shall
convene appropriate panels of experts qualified in the fields mentioned and
determine the composition and terms of reference of any such panels. Within
one year of being convened, the panels will report their conclusions, through
the Secretariat, to the Parties.
Id. In a footnote to Annex A of the protocol, it is expressly noted that "[the] ozone
depleting potentials are estimates based on existing knowledge and will be reviewed
and revised periodically." Id. Annex A. So far, there have been five such adjustments,
decided at the second, fourth, seventh, ninth and eleventh meetings. See id. at i (noting
the five adjustments).
83.
Conference of the Parties of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants, 4th mtg., Geneva, Switz., May 4-8, 2009, Report of the Conference
of the Parties, para. 76, U.N. Doc. UNEP/POPS/COP.4/38 (May 8, 2009) [hereinafter
Stockholm Fourth Meeting].
84.
See id. at 63-69 (acknowledging that the Conference of the Parties
considered the risk profile and risk management evaluations for each chemical prior to
issuing the report).
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Multilateral Environment Agreement (MEA) treaty bodies.8 5 A
number of initiatives have been launched with the aim of regrouping
treaty bodies from different MEAs. For instance, the scientific bodies
established under the UNFCCC, the CBD, and the United Nations
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) collaborate closely
through a joint liaison group in order to find synergies in a number of
issues, including scientific cooperation and capacity-building.
Similarly, the parties to the Basel,8 6 Prior Informed Consent (PIC),
and POP Conventions have established an Ad Hoc Working Group on
Enhancing Cooperation and Coordination among the Basel,
Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions focusing on implementation
and capacity-building strategies.8 7

85.
See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res 60/1, paras. 48-55, U.N. Dec
A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 25, 2005) (calling for increased international cooperation on
environmental issues); U.N. Environment Programme, Governing Council, Report of

the Governing Council on the Work of its Seventh Special Session/Global Ministerial
Environment Forum, Annex I at 23, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GCSS.VII/6 (Mar. 5, 2002)
(providing record of Decision SS.VII/1, which adopted the recommendations of the
Open-Ended Intergovernmental Group of Ministers on International Environmental
Governance to increase the coherency and strengh of the international environmental
governance regime); Co-Chairs' Options Paper, U.N. Gen. Assembly, Informal
Consultative Process on the Institutional Framework for the United Nations'
Environmental Activities (June 14, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/ga/president/
61/follow-up/environment/EG-OptionsPaper.PDF
(reporting on research on the
disadvantages of fragmentation in international environmental governance); cf.
INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: SYNERGY AND
CONFLICT AMONG INTERNATIONAL AND EU POLICIES (Sebastian Oberthir & Thomas
Gehring eds., 2006) (providing an overview of the challenges of fragmentation).
86.
For a discussion of the steps leading to this collaboration, see UNFCCC,
Cooperation with International Organizations, http://unfcc.int/cooperation-and_
support/cooperationwith international_organizations/items/2533.php
(last visited
Mar. 9, 2009). In November 2004, the UNFCCC secretariat prepared a Note on options
for enhanced cooperation among the three Rio Conventions. Note by the Secretariat,
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Options for Enhanced Cooperation
Among the Three Rio Conventions, U.N. Doc. SFCCC/SBSTA/2004/INF.19 (Nov. 2,
2004). By March 2006, State parties submitted their views on the options
contemplated. Submissions from Parties, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Views on the Paper on Options for Enhanced Cooperation Among the Three
Rio Conventions, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.4 (Mar. 23, 2006); see also U.N.
Environment Programme, Joint Liaison Group of the Convention on Biological
Diversity, United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, & United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Eighth Meeting, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/13/INF/18
(Nov. 13, 2007) (providing an update on the
development of these synergies).
87.
The Joint Group was established by Decision SC-2/15, adopted by COP of
the POP Convention at its second meeting, U.N. Environmental Programme,

Secretariat, Cooperation and Synergies: Decision SC-2/15 Adopted by the Second
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CHW.8/INF/10 (July 28, 2006) [hereinafter
Decision SC-2/15], Decision RC-3/8, adopted by the COP of the PIC Convention at its
third meeting, U.N. Environmental Programme, Secretariat, Cooperation and

Synergies: Decision RC-3/8 Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Rotterdam
Convention at its Third Meeting, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CHW.8/INF/11 (Oct. 31, 2006), and
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Managerial Approaches to Compliance88

Traditional approaches to international politics largely excluded
the idea of normativity as playing an important role in the stability of
the international society.8 9 From the 1980s onwards, however,
another view started to develop based on the assumption that "norms
provide the foundation for [the] compliance process."90 At the roots of

Decision VIII/8, adopted by the COP of the Basel Convention at its eighth meeting,
Conference of the Parties To The Convention on Biological Diversity, Mar. 20-31, 2006,

Curitiba, Braz., Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Partiesto the Convention on
Biological Diversity at its Eighth Meeting, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DECNIII/8
(June 15, 2006). The Joint Group was entrusted with the mandate of preparing "joint
recommendations on enhanced cooperation and coordination among the three
conventions at the administrative and programmatic levels." Decision SC-2/15, supra,
para. 6. The Joint Group's recommendations were recently adopted by the three COPs.
Stockholm Fourth Meeting, supra note 83, paras. 170-75 & Annex I at 26, 96-102.
88.
See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYEs, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995)

(examining the concept of "sovereignty" and proposing a new model of treaty
compliance);

ENGAGING

COUNTRIES:

STRENGTHENING

COMPLIANCE

WITH

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson
eds., 1998) (examining how and why compliance and implementation with treaties vary
and change over time); Abram Chayes et al., Managing Compliance: A Comparative
Perspective,

in

ENGAGING

COUNTRIES:

STRENGTHENING

COMPLIANCE

WITH

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS, supra, at 39 (examining how treaty
provisions and international institutions make treaties work).
89.
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, InternationalNorm Dynamics and
Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 889-90 (explaining that normative concerns were
"pushed aside" in the 1970s, only to be revived in the 1980s).
90.
Chayes et al., supra note 88, at 42. In a previous influential contribution to
the compliance literature, Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes observed:
In common experience, people-whether as a result of socialisation or
otherwise-accept that they are obligated to obey the law. The existence of
legal obligation, for most actors in most situations, translates into a
presumption of compliance, in the absence of strong countervailing
circumstances. So it is with states. It is often said that the fundamental norm
of international law is pacta sunt servanda-treatiesare to be obeyed. In the
United States and many other countries, they become a part of the law of the
land. Thus, a provision contained in an agreement to which a state has
formally assented entails a legal obligation to obey and is presumptively a
guide to action.
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 88, at 8. Chayes and Chayes refer in this connection to
the works of FREDERICK F.

SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL

EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED

DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE (1991),

and

FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS AND DECISIONS (1989), who have pointed

out that norms are themselves "reason[s] for action," and as such they have an
independent weight on the decision making process. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 88,
at 8. In this sense, "[niorms help define the methods and terms of the continuing
international discourse in which states seek to justify their actions." Id. It would
otherwise be inconceivable that diplomats and government leaders spend time, effort
and resources in the negotiation, drafting and signature of international treaties.
Moreover, if treaties had but a formal existence, why should a country refuse to ratify a
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this view, which came to be known as the "managerial approach" to
compliance, is the proposition that states act in good faith and, as a
rule, do not engage in a treaty for merely tactical reasons. Thus, as
noted by three commentators, "[i]f a normative consensus on an issue
area exists, then much initial compliance may be motivated by this
consensus rather than by treaty compliance mechanisms."9 1
It
follows, for the managerial approach, that there are several means to
ensure compliance other than the traditional enforcement
mechanisms such as liability and responsibility. The managerial
approach devotes particular attention to transparency and
compliance management. 92
Even assuming good faith and a proclivity towards compliance as
the baseline of compliance dynamics, the attitude of a particular state
will heavily depend on both its perception of other states' behavior
and of its individual situation. In this context:
[tiransparency fosters compliance by permitting actors to co-ordinate
their behavior, reassuring actors who desire to co-operate but fear being
'suckered', and deterring actors contemplating non-compliance. In
many instances, the actor's independent responses to these forces will
assure compliance. Where strategic interaction is insufficient,
transparency allows other parties to observe deviations from prescribed
conduct and to require that those deviations be accounted for and
93
justified.

In other words, transparency is crucial to foster coordination,
reassurance, and deterrence. Although these three dimensions are
closely related to each other, 94 it is mainly the coordination problem

given treaty? States usually refer to legal norms to justify their behaviour, which by
the same token reinforces the legitimacy of such norms and create expectations of
conformity. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 88, ch. II (discussing the power of norms
in achieving treaty compliance). In short, international agreements do matter, and
normativity is an essential factor in the compliance dynamics.
91.
Chayes et al., supra note 88, at 42.
92.
Id. at 43. Chayes, Chayes, and Mitchell define transparency as "the
adequacy, accuracy, availability, and accessibility of knowledge and information about
the policies and activities of parties to the treaty, and of the central organisations
established by it on matters relevant to compliance and effectiveness, and about the
operation of the norms, rules, and procedures established by the treaty." Id.
93.
Id.
94.
There are many cases in which states are more interested in finding a
uniform guide of behavior than in the precise content of this guide. In such cases,
usually referred to as "pure coordination problems", states' spontaneous propensity to
comply will easily unleash if a good understanding of the rules is made possible.
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 88, at 136-37. Thus, "[i]n a situation where the
incentives for co-operative action are strong, little more may be needed than
transparency of the rule system itself to induce compliance." Id. at 137. Coordination
problems, however, are more complex than this simple logic may show. Many times,
"actors otherwise inclined to comply are concerned that they will be placed at a
disadvantage if their compliance is not matched by others." Chayes et al., supra note
88, at 44. In this context, transparency can be very useful because it "reassures parties
that others are meeting their obligations; and if they are not, it permits a timely
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that arises in connection with scientific uncertainty. Indeed, in some
cases, developing countries lack the scientific capabilities to comply
with an international regime, despite their inclination to do so. This
was, for instance, a major component of the recent discussions at COP
4 of the POP Convention on the desirability of including nine new
chemicals to the lists of controlled substances and led to the adoption
of a decision to increase the capabilities of such states.95 Basic
obligations such as inventorying and reporting may require scientific
and technological capabilities that many countries do not have, and
transparency cannot exist without such basic obligations being
reasonably fulfilled. 96 This is why financial, technology transfer, and
capacity-building mechanisms are of paramount importance both
generally for the implementation of a regime and specifically for
dealing with scientific and technological advances.9 7

response." Id. But transparency does not only reassure those parties willing to comply;
it also deters potential deliberate breaches. Id. The more easily breaches are
discovered, the more easily they are immediately punished either by the system (if a
central mechanism of sanctions is established) or by other States (unilaterally or
collectively). Id. Thus, transparency makes it more difficult for deliberate defectors to
get away with it. Here again, the managerial approach borrows rational choice
arguments to endorse its propositions.
95.
See Stockholm Fourth Meeting, supra note 83, paras. 77, 103.
During the discussions under each chemical, some representatives noted the
implications for developing countries and countries with economies in
transition of listing new chemicals in the Convention. Observing that some of
those countries were currently facing difficulties implementing the Convention,
they pointed out that the addition of nine chemicals raised further financial
and technical challenges. One representative said that while some technical
and financial assistance had been provided it was insufficient to ensure the
requisite capacity-building to meet the obligations of the Convention: the
addition of new chemicals would only increase an already heavy burden.
Another representative argued that financial and technical assistance should
be comprehensive, adequate and foreseeable so as to help developing countries
in their efforts to manage stocks and wastes and to process and treat
contaminated areas. . . . In the light of the discussion above on the inclusion of
new chemicals in the annexes to the Convention, in particular in respect of the
challenges that developing country Parties and Parties with economies in
transition would face in implementing their obligations under the Convention
with regard to such chemicals, the Conference agreed to entrust the Secretariat
with preparation of a draft decision for consideration by the Conference on a
programme of work aimed at helping Parties to meet those obligations.
Id. The draft decision appears in Annex I to the report.
96.
See Stockholm Fourth Meeting, supra note 83, Annex I at 70
(demonstrating this link in the preamble of Decision SC-4/19, which refers to the
obligations of the Parties, particularly in art. 6, and to the need to render "timely and
adequate technical assistance" pursuant to art. 12(1) of the POP Convention).
97.
See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Technical and Financial Assistance
and Compliance: The Interplay, in ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH MULTILATERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN PRACTITIONERS AND ACADEMIA
273, 275 (Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds., 2006) (explaining that "the extent to which
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In such cases, the mere imposition of sanctions would be of little
effect either in the short or in the longer term. Adversarial or
accusatory models would thus be less suitable than an approach that
understands compliance as an ongoing process of compliance
management.98 A more flexible and less suspicious approach should
first be applied in order to identify the real causes of non-compliance
and take suitable decision. As Chayes and Mitchell observed:
Although effective regime management requires distinguishing willful
violation from unintentional non-compliance, the process starts with
the assumption that all regime members are engaged in a common
enterprise. Initially, assessments seek to discover how to improve
individual and system performance. Secretariats and other parties give
states ample - sometimes, it seems, excessive - opportunities to explain
and justify their conduct. Technical or financial assistance may be
provided. Promises of improvement contain increasingly concrete,
detailed, and measurable undertakings. If resistance persists, however,
states and the secretariat may take more confrontational stances and
intensify pressures for compliance. This process creates pressures to
correct
suspect
conduct
attributable
to
inadvertence,
misunderstanding, or inattention while identifying, exposing, and
99
isolating deliberate offenders.

Thus, there is a sort of transition phase that defines the type of
violation and the more suitable response. If states are initially
presumed to act in good faith, this presumption can be progressively
reversed and the process may lead to the imposition of sanctions.
This process essentially is interactive and aims both at affecting
states' behavior and adjusting or, if needed, revising some rules of the
regime. The Basel Convention regime is an interesting illustration of
this process.1 00 Article 4(2) of the Convention reflects the view that
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes can be reduced
through not only more stringent export controls but also a reduction
of waste generation at the source country and local management and

developing country Parties will effectively implement their treaty obligations depends
on the effective implementation by developed Parties of their commitments to provide
financial resources and technology").
98.
This latter concept involves essentially three components:
1. Reviewing and assessing the performance of the parties in order to identify
problems with the regime itself and to distinguish intentional violations from
other types of non-compliance; 2. Ensuring that appropriate responses to noncompliance and violations produce and maintain a level of compliance
acceptable to the regime parties; 3. Adjusting the rules to improve regime
performance.
Chayes et al., supra note 88, at 44.
Id.
99.
100.
See generally Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57
[hereinafter Basel Convention] (establishing an agreement to prevent the
transportation of hazardous waste between countries).
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disposal of waste.10 1 This in turn requires the building up of
adequate capabilities in those states where the necessary technology
is not available.10 2 Where the lack of such capabilities leads to noncompliance, the initial response takes the form of an inquiry into the
root causes of such non-compliance and, if appropriate, technical and
performance reporting assistance is provided. 0 3 If such assistance
does not yield the expected results, the implementing committee can
either provide additional assistance or issue a cautionary
statement.104

101.
Id.
102.
See id. art. 14(1) ("The Parties agree that, according to the specific needs of
different regions and subregions, regional or sub-regional centres for training and
technology transfers regarding the management of hazardous wastes and other wastes
and the minimization of their generation should be established.").
103.
Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 6th mtg., Geneva,

Switz., Dec. 9-13, 2002, Report of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention
on the Control of TransboundaryMovements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal,
app., para. 19, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CHW.6/40 (Feb. 10, 2003). In 2002, the COP of the
Basel Convention established a Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and
Compliance (Decision VI/12), as a subsidiary body within the meaning of article
15(5)(e). Id. Annex at 45. The terms of reference of the Compliance Committee allow for
a non-compliance procedure to be launched by the non-compliying party, other party, or
the Secretariat. Id. app., para. 9. Pursuant to para. 19 of the Terms of Reference, in the
"faciliation procedure" thus instituted, the committee will seek to
determin[e] the facts and root causes of the matter of concern and, assist in its
resolution. As part of this process, the Committee may provide a Party, after
coordination with that Party, with advice, non-binding recommendations and
information relating to, inter alia . . . Facilitation of assistance in particular to
developing countries and countries with economies in transition, including on
how to access financial and technical support, including technology transfer
and capacity-building.
Id. app., para. 19.
104.
Id. app., para. 20.
If, after undertaking the facilitation procedure in paragraph 19 above and
taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of compliance
difficulties, as well as the capacity of the Party whose compliance is in
question, the Committee considers it necessary in the light of paragraphs 1 and
2 to pursue further measures to address a Party's compliance difficulties, it
may recommend to the Conference of the Parties that it consider: (a) Further
support under the Convention for the Party concerned, including prioritization
of technical assistance and capacity-building and access to financial resources;
or (b) Issuing a cautionary statement and providing advice regarding future
compliance in order to help Parties to implement the provisions of the Basel
Convention and to promote cooperation between all Parties.

Id.
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Prior Informed Consent' 05

An implementation difficulty related to the one discussed in the
preceding subpart is the ability of developing countries to effectively
manage, in addition to hazardous wastes, pesticides and industrial
chemicals exported to their countries. Again, this is above all a
matter of both administrative and scientific or technological
capabilities. The report of the Commission on Environment and
Development noted:
Third World importers have no way to effectively control trade in
chemicals that have been banned or severely restricted in exporting
countries. Thus these countries badly need the infrastructure to assess
106
the risks associated with chemical use.

The prior informed consent (PIC) mechanism, as it later came to be
known, was a legal technique developed to deal with this difficulty.
PIC must be viewed as both a principle and a procedure. As a
principle, PIC has two main dimensions: first, "a requirement that
when one State plans to operate in another State that it must seek
that State's prior informed consent;" 0 7 second, "a requirement
emanating from indigenous rights that communities, particularly
indigenous communities, have the right to give (or withhold) their
free, prior informed consent to activities that affect them".108 It is the
first dimension of the PIC principle that is more directly relevant for
our analysis.
It is unclear whether this principle has customary status in
international law. Be that as it may, the obligation of not only
notifying but also obtaining the "informed consent" of another state
appears in a number of multilateral environmental agreements in
connection with specific activities. 0 9 Thus, under Article 6(4) of the
Basel Convention, transporting hazardous wastes through the
territory of another State is subject to a PIC obligation."10 Similarly,
Article 15(5) of the CBD subjects the prospection for genetic resources
in the territory of another state to a PIC obligation. Another more

105.
On this issue, see Jonathan Krueger, PriorInformed Consent and the Basel
Convention: The Hazards of What Isn't Known, 7 J. ENV'T & DEV. 115 (1998), and
Jonathan Krueger, Information in International Environmental Governance: The Prior
Informed Consent Procedure for Trade in Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides (Sept.
2000) (unpublished discussion paper, on file with Harvard University's Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs).
106.
World Comm'n on Env't and Dev., Development and InternationalEconomic
Co-operation:Environment, Annex, ch. 8, para. 72, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987).
107.
DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 528 (3rd ed. 2007).
108.
Id.
109.
See id. at 528-29 (listing activities requiring prior informed consent from
various multilateral environmental agreements).
110.
See Basel Convention, supra note 100, art. 6(4).
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general example is provided by the system of the 1998 PIC
Convention,111 which attaches a PIC obligation to exports of
domestically banned or severally restricted chemicals that have been
included in the convention's Annex III (which currently covers
twenty-five pesticides, four severely hazardous pesticide formulations
and eleven industrial chemicals).112
These agreements spell out the PIC obligation by establishing a
specific procedure to be followed, including, as the case may be,
details as to infrastructure that must be set up domestically, the
information to be provided to the importing state, or the steps to be
taken in case the importing state does not answer. The origins of the
PIC procedure are found in the voluntary guidelines elaborated under
the aegis of UNEP and the FAO.113 Despite some differences in
scope, the 1985 FAO International Code of Conduct on the
Distribution and Use of Pesticides (the Code)11 4 and the 1987 UNEP
London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in
International Trade (the Guidelines)," 5 both as amended in 1989,
characterized PIC as a principle to be implemented by a specific
procedure.
Indeed, with some minor differences in wording
(reflecting differences in substantive scope), Article 2 of the Code and
paragraphs 1(g) and (h) of the Guidelines characterized PIC as
the principle that international shipment of a pesticide [or] a chemical
that is banned or severely restricted in order to protect human health
or the environment should not proceed without the agreement, where
such agreement exists, or contrary to the decision of the designated
116
national authority in the participating importing country.

In turn, the implementing procedure was characterized as "the
procedure for formally obtaining and disseminating the decisions of
importing countries as to whether they wish to receive future
shipments of pesticides [or] chemicals that have been banned or
severely restricted.""' 7 The voluntary procedure established by the

111.
See generally Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade,
Feb. 24, 2004, 2244 U.N.T.S. 337. [hereafter PIC Convention].
112.
Id. Annex III.

113.

See Mohamed Ali Mekouar, Pesticides and Chemicals: The Requirement of

PriorInformed Consent, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 146 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (reviewing

PIC provisions and dicussing implementation).
114.
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON
THE DISTRIBUTION AND USE OF PESTICIDES (rev. ed. 2002), available at
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005IY4544E/y4544eOO.htm.
115.

U.N.

ENVIROMENTAL

PROGRAMME,

LONDON

GUIDELINES

FOR

THE

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON CHEMICALS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1989), available
at http://www.chem.unep.chlethics/english/longuien.htm.
116.
Mekouar, supra note 113, at 146-47.
117.
Id. at 147.

2010/

SCIENTIFIC UNCER TAINTY IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

467

Code and the Guidelines was operational until February 2006, when
the PIC Convention entered into force making the obligations
constituting the PIC procedure legally binding.
7.

Environmental Impact Assessment and Monitoring

18

Another technique that must be viewed as both a principle and a
procedure is the environmental impact assessment (EIA) and
monitoring of projects or activities and plans/programmes with
potentially adverse environmental repercussions. 119 EIAs seek to
circumscribe ex ante the environmental risks created by such projects
in order to assess the desirability of pursuing them. Such exercises
are often difficult due to the considerable scientific uncertainties that
must be overcome to circumscribe a risk. For this reason, they are
often supplemented by the monitoring of the environmental risks
anticipated as work on the project develops.
The scope and legal grounding of the principle of EIA are not
entirely clear. References to the need to conduct an EIA prior to
undertaking certain projects appear in both domestic and

118.
See generally NEIL CRAIK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT ASSESSMENT: PROCESS, SUBSTANCE, AND INTEGRATION (2008) (examining EIAs

to determine efficacy in meeting international environmental law policy goals and their
interplay in influencing state action); JOHN GLASSON, RIKI THERIVEL, & ANDREW
CHADWICK, INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (UCL Press 2nd
ed. 2005) (1994) (providing a comprehensive introduction of EIAs); THE PRACTICE OF
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (Riki Therivel & Maria Rosario Paridario

eds., Earthscan 1996) (examining the increase in the use of strategic environmental
assessments and discussing best practices); TAKING STOCK OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE (Jane Holder & Donald McGillivray eds.,
Routledge-Cavendish 2007) (providing essays from American and European experts on
the environmental assessment process); CHRISTOPHER WOOD, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW, (Prentice Hall 2d ed. 2003) (1995) (providing an
analysis of EIAs used in the U.S., U.K., the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, and
South Africa).
See Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
119.
Context app. I, Feb. 28, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Espoo Convention]
(listing the activities to which EIA shall apply, including energy production utilities,
metal smelters, chemical installations, motorway projects, trade and inland ports,
waste disposal installations, large dams, pulp and paper mills, mining, etc., with some
specifications). Once in force, the Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to
the Espoo Convention (also known as the "SEA" or "Kiev" Protocol) will intervene at a
much earlier phase of the decision making process than EIAs and focuses on "plans and
programmes," or, in other words, on economic policies. Protocol on Strategic
Environmental Assessment to the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in
a Transboundary Context, May 21, 2003, U.N. Doc. ECEIMP.EIA/2003/2 (not currently
in force) (adopted by the parties to the Espoo Convention at the Ministerial
at
available
in
2003),
Conference
for
Europe"
"Environment
http://www.unece.orglenv/eia/sea_ protocol.htm [hereinafter SEA Protocol]. I will
revisit the relevance of this point in the discussion of the importance of this technique
for dealing with scientific uncertainty, infra pp. 32-33.
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international treaty law.120 International soft law instruments also
mention this principle.' 2 ' For instance, Principle 17 of the Rio
Declaration states: "Environmental impact assessment, as a national
instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely
to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are

120.
See CBD, supra note 42, art. 14 (providing procedures for parties to conduct
enviromental impact assessment and minimize adverse impacts); UNFCCC, supra note
40, art. 4(1)(f) (noting that parties that should take climate change considerations into
account in their relevant social, economic, and environmental policies and actions);
Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife to the Convention for the
Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean
Region art. 13, Jan. 18, 1990, 2180 U.N.T.S. 101 (protecting "rare and fragile"
ecosystems in the Caribbean region); Protocol for the Conservation and Management of
Protected Marine and Coastal Areas of the South-East Pacific art. 8, Sept. 21, 1989,
availabe at
http://www2.unitar.org/cwm/publications/cbl/synergy/pdf/cat3/UNEP
regional seas/convention lima/protocol conservation.pdf (requiring signatories to
conduct an EIA on activities likely to create an "adverse impact"); Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources art. 14, July 9, 1985, available at http://www.aseansec.org/1490.htm
(providing for mutual efforts by Southeast Asian nations to preserve the environment);
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 206, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (Dec. 10,
1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS] (providing that when States have grounds to believe that
planned activities could cause substantial pollution or significant and harmful changes
to the marine environment, they should assess the potential effects and communicate
findings); U.N. ECON. COMM'N FOR EUR., CURRENT POLICIES, STRATEGIES AND ASPECTS
OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN A TRANSBOUNDARY CONTEXT, U.N. Doc.

ECE/CEP/9, U.N. Sales No. E.96.II.E.11 (1996) (providing an assessment of various
approaches to EIAs by country delegations to the Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context).
121.
See Rio Declaration, supra note 39, princ. 17 ("Environmental impact
assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that
are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a
decision of a competent national authority."); Conference on Environment and
Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., Agenda 21, ch. 8.4(d), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 151/26/Rev. 1 (suggesting countries develop policies that improve the decision
making processes, including those that require systematic monitoring and evaluation
and regular reviews of the state's human resource development, economic and social
conditions and trends); U.N. Enviromental Programme, Goals and Principles of
Environmental Impact Assessment, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.14/2.37-B (Jan. 16, 1987)
(providing principles for the "examination, analysis, and assessment of planned
activiites with a view to ensuring environmentally sound and sustainable
development"); U.N. Enviromental Programme, Environmental Law Guidelines and
Principles on Shared Natural Resources, princ. 4 (May 19, 1978), available at
http://www.unep.org/LawlPDF/UNEPEnvironmental-Law-Guidelines-and-Principles.pdf
("States should make environmental assessment before engaging in any activity with
respect to a shared natural resource which may create a risk of significantly affecting the
environment of another State or States sharing that resource."); Int'l Law Comm'n,

Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, ch.
V, § E.1.97, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Aug. 10, 2001) ("Any decision in respect of the
authorization of an activity within the scope of the present articles shall, in particular,
be based on an assessment of the possible transboundary harm caused by that activity,
including any environmental impact assessment.").
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subject to a decision of a competent national authority." 122 The
principle and its link to environmental monitoring were also
mentioned in the separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry in the case
concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project. 23 The question of
whether such a principle is grounded in customary international law
remains unsettled, however, and significantly depends upon the scope
that is assigned to the principle (i.e., national, transboundary,
global).1 24 For the purposes of this Article, however, the latter point
is less important than the analysis of how EIA and monitoring is in
fact used to deal with scientific uncertainty. This takes us from EIA
as a principle to EIA as a procedure.
The procedure varies considerably according to the underlying
legal instrument.
Some procedures involve only a few steps
(preliminary assessment followed, if necessary, by a full EIA),'12 5
whereas others entail multiple steps and sometimes several EIAs.1 2 6
Similarly, the degree of public involvement in the EIA process also
varies, ranging from privately conducted EIAs with more or less room
for the intervention of public stake-holders to EIAs conducted by
public inspectors.1 27 The contents of EIAs may also differ from one
context to the other. For instance, Article 4(1) and Appendix II to the
Espoo Convention require the following minimum contents:

122.
Rio Declaration,supra note 39, princ. 18.
123.
Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 112 (Sept. 25)
(separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry). Judge Weeramantry stated:
Environmental law in its current state of development would read into treaties
which may reasonably be considered to have a significant impact upon the
environment, a duty of environmental impact assessment and this means also,
whether the treaty expressly so provides or not, a duty of monitoring the
environmental impacts of any substantial project during the operation of the
scheme.
Id.; see also Jorge E. Vinuales, The Contributionof the InternationalCourt of Justice to
the Development of InternationalEnvironmental Law: A Contemporary Assessment, 32
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 232, 244-53 (2008) (discussing the context of Gab6ikovoNagymaros Project opinion).
124.
See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 37, at 164-75 (providing a recent survey of
this question); HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 107, at 531-33 (same).
125.
See Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty art. 8,
Annex 1, Oct. 4, 2001, 30 I.L.M. 1455 (providing procedures for conducting
environmental impact assessments).
126.
See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 37, at 174 (noting that EIA can occur in
several stages depending on complexity of project).
127.
See id. (noting that some EIA procedures provide for an element of public
participation).
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A description of the proposed activity and its purpose;
A description, where appropriate, of reasonable alternatives (for
example, locational or technological) to the proposed activity and
also the no-action alternative;
A description of the environment likely to be significantly
affected by the proposed activity and its alternatives;
A description of the potential environmental impact of the
proposed activity and its alternatives and an estimation of its
significance;

(e)

A description of mitigation measures
environmental impact to a minimum;

(f)

An explicit indication of predictive methods and underlying
assumptions as well as the relevant environmental data used;

(g)

An identification of gaps in knowledge and uncertainties
encountered in compiling the required information;

(h)

Where appropriate, an outline for monitoring and management
programmes and any plans for post-project analysis; and

(i)

A non-technical summary including a visual presentation as
appropriate (maps, graphs, etc.). 1 2 8

to

keep

adverse

These variations in the formulation of EIAs as to the number of
steps, degree of public involvement, and minimum contents are
directly relevant for the purpose of understanding the role of EIAs in
dealing with scientific uncertainty. Regarding steps, the higher the
complexity and the longer the lifespan of a project, the higher the
scientific uncertainty involved in the assessment of the risks
presented by it. This explains why, in such cases, multiple EIAs may
be conducted at different stages of the development of the project, as
a form of monitoring its evolving environmental repercussions and
the evolving scientific understanding of such repercussions. With
respect to the degree of public involvement in and the minimum
contents of EIAs, the aforementioned variations suggest that EIAs
serve two different functions.
The first is to circumscribe the
environmental risks involved in undertaking or pursuing a project in
light of the scientific and technological knowledge at the time the EIA
is conducted. The second is to legitimize, not only scientifically but
also politically, the pursuit of a given initiative.
This second function can be illustrated by reference to the socalled strategic environmental assessments or "SEAs," which focus on
strategic policies even before any concrete action has been taken to
implement them. Once in force, Article 4(2) of the SEA Protocol to
the Espoo Convention will require State Parties to conduct
[a] strategic environmental assessment . . . for plans and programmes
which are prepared for agriculture, forestry, fisheries, energy, industry
including mining, transport, regional development, waste management,

128.

Espoo Convention, supra note 119, app. II.
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water management, telecommunications, tourism, town and country
planning or land use, and which set the framework for future
development consent for projects [that require] an environmental
129
impact assessment under national legislation.

Here, the emphasis of the environmental assessment is clearly on the
desirability of a political choice rather than on the specific ecological
processes that may be disturbed by pursuing a given project or
activity. Although the scientific assessment of such policy choices
remains important, it is relegated to a secondary position, behind the
policy's political desirability. This prioritization of the social function
of environmental assessments is not only a feature of SEAs but also
affects, to a significant extent, the more traditional EIAs of projects.
This latter point is suggested by the case law on the judicial review of
EIAs. Whereas in the international trade context, the (quasi) judicial
review of domestic risk assessment seems to be admitted,130 the

129.
SEA Protocol, supra note 119. See also id. Annexes I-II for a listing of
projects affected by art. 4(2) (including crude oil refineries, integrated chemical
installations, construction of motorways, intensive fish farming, and surface storage of
fossil fuels and natural gas).
130.
Indeed, in the EC-Hormones case, the Panel had considered that the risk
assessment referred to in art. 5.1 of the SPS Agreement was a scientific examination of
data and factual studies, as opposed to a policy exercise involving social value
judgments. Complaint by the United States, European Communities-Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products, para. 8.94, WT/DS26/RIUSA (Aug. 18, 1997).
When reviewing the Panel's report upon appeal by the EC, the WTO Appellate Body
relied on a broader interpretation of risk assessments and their relationship to SPS
measures. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-MeasuresConcerningMeat
and Meat Products, para. 194, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). In
particular, the Panel stated:
We do not believe that a risk assessment has to come to a monolithic conclusion
that coincides with the scientific conclusion or view implicit in the SPS
measure. The risk assessment could set out both the prevailing view
representing the 'mainstream' of scientific opinion, as well as the opinions of
scientists taking a divergent view. Article 5.1 does not require that the risk
assessment must necessarily embody only the view of a majority of the relevant
scientific community. In some cases, the very existence of divergent views
presented by qualified scientists who have investigated the particular issue at
hand may indicate a state of scientific uncertainty. Sometimes the divergence
may indicate a roughly equal balance of scientific opinion, which may itself be a
form of scientific uncertainty. In most cases, responsible and representative
governments tend to base their legislative and administrative measures on
'mainstream' scientific opinion. In other cases, equally responsible and
representative governments may act in good faith on the basis of what, at a
given time, may be a divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected
sources. By itself, this does not necessarily signal the absence of a reasonable
relationship between the SPS measure and the risk assessment, especially
where the risk involved is life-threatening in character and is perceived to
constitute a clear and imminent threat to public health and safety.
Determination of the presence or absence of that relationship can only be done
on a case-to-case basis, after account is taken of all considerations rationally
bearing upon the issue of potential adverse health effects.
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picture that emerges from the domestic case law depicts EIAs as a
tool "to assist the decision maker and alert the public,"1 31 rather than
as comprehensive scientific assessments of the environmental risks.
This is not to say that this technique is not relevant for dealing
with scientific uncertainty, even beyond the international trade
context. As decision making tools, EIAs play a significant advocacy
role (gathering support, both socially and scientifically) either in
favor of or against a particular project or activity. Two apposite cases
in this regard are the Pulp Mills dispute between Argentina and
Uruguay before the ICJ and MOXPlant cases and arbitrations.132 In
both cases, the respective claimants raised the potential inadequacy
of the EIA conducted by the respondent state and requested
provisional measures on the basis of precautionary reasoning.
Although the measures requested were not granted, 3 3 one
interesting element that can be derived from these decisions is that,
as in the international trade context, the minimum content of an EIA
appears to reflect upon its scientific authoritativeness, which in turn
may pave the way for either the judicial review of the measures taken
on the basis of a deficient EIA or the grant of provisional relief.

Id. However, the Appellate Body concluded that the EC had not conducted an
assessment within the meaning of art. 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement and confirmed
the decision of the Panel in this regard. Id. para. 208. The possibility of reviewing the
sufficiency of a risk assessment has been confirmed by the Appellate Body in the
Japan-Apples case. Appellate Body Report, Japan-MeasuresAffecting the Importatin
ofApples, para. 202, WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov. 26, 2003). In EC-Biotechnology, the WTO
Panel found that the general moratorium applied by several EC countries was not
justified under art. 5.1 of the SPS Agreement because it was not based on a sufficient
risk assessment. Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 4.237, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R,
WT[DS293WT/R (Sept. 29, 2006).
131.
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. V. Uru.) (Verbatim R. of the Public
Sitting on Oct. 1, 2009), at 46, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/135/15505.pdf (citing Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989);
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989); Belize Alliance of
Conservation Non-Governmental Org. v. Dept. of Env't, [2003] UKPC 63 (Belize);
Prineas v. Foresty Comm'n of New S. Wales, 49 LGERA 402 (1983) (Austl.)).
132.
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.) (Order of July 13, 2006),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/11235.pdf- MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.)
(Order No. 3 of June 24, 2003) (Perm. Ct. Arb.), available at http://www.pcacpa.org/upload/files/MOX%200rder%20no3.pdf; MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.) (Order of Dec.
3, 2001), 41 I.L.M. 405 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea), available at http://www.itlos.org/case
documents/2001/document en_197.pdf. The MOX plant case involved proceedings
before four different fora, namely an arbitral tribunal under the OSPAR Convention,
the ITLOS, an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII to UNCLOS, and the European Court
of Justice. Id. Here, I am only concerned with Ireland's requests for interim relief
before ITLOS and the Annex VII Tribunal (Permanent Court of Arbitration).
133.
See infra text accompanying notes 135-40.
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Provisional MeasureS134

Provisional measures intervene a step later than the techniques
so far reviewed, at what has been characterized as the reparation
stage. Such measures are, of course, not specific to IEL and are found
in most areas of domestic, arbitral, and international adjudication.
They are, however, particularly relevant in the context of IEL, where
damages are difficult to assess and full reparation can seldom be
achieved. Therefore, in dealing with the conformity of a given set of
acts with IEL it may sometimes be important to take preventive
action before the merits of a dispute are fully assessed. Such was the
argument of Argentina in its Request for the Indication of Provisional
Measures in the Pulp Mills case and of Ireland in the MOX Plant
case.
Regarding the Pulp Mills case, in its request of May 4, 2006,
Argentina argued inter alia that the suspension of the construction
authorizations issued by Uruguay to two pulp mills was necessary to
prevent potentially irreparable damage to the ecosystem of the river
Uruguay and the quality of its waters.s3 5 In its Order of July 13,
2006, the Court recalled with reference to its previous case law that
its power to indicate provisional measures was to be exercised "only if
there is an urgent need to prevent irreparable prejudice to the rights
that are the subject of the dispute before the Court has had an
opportunity to render its decision."136 It then recognized Argentina's
concern to protect its natural environment and the quality of the

134.
See SHABATI ROSENNE, PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005) (providing further discussion on this topic).
135.
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), paras. 9, 13 (Req. for
Indication of Provisional Measures by Arg. of May 4, 2006). The original French text
states:
9. La construction et la mise en service 6ventuelle des usines de pAte A papier
certainement causent et sont susceptibles de causer des dommages A
l'environnement de nature irr~versible du fait de l'impact potentiel sur tout
l'6cosyst6me du fleuve Uruguay et sur la qualitA de ses eaux. De tels dommages
de nature irriversible annihileraient le droit de l'Argentine et de ses
ressortissants A une exploitation et une utilisation rationnelles, 6quitables et
raisonnables des ressources du fleuve ... 13. Sans l'adoption des mesures
conservatoires demanddes, la mise en service des usines CM33 et Orion avant
qu'un arrit d6finitif soit rendu provoquerait des prjudices graves et
irriversibles A la prbservation de l'environnement du fleuve Uruguay et de ses
zones d'influence ainsi que aux droits de l'Argentine et des habitants des zones
avoisinantes soiis sa juridiction.

Id.
136.
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.) (Order of July 13, 2006),
para. 62 (citing Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), 2003 I.C.J. 107,
para. 22 (Jun. 17); Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1991 I.C.J. 12, para.
23 (July 29)).
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water of the river Uruguay,1 37 but concluded that there was "nothing
in the record to demonstrate that the very decision by Uruguay to
authorize the construction of the mills poses an imminent threat of
irreparable damage to the aquatic environment of the River
Uruguay."' 3 8 Similarly, in the MOX Plant case, Ireland argued
before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
inter alia that
once plutonium is introduced into the MOX plant and it commences
operations, some discharges into the marine environment will occur,
with irreversible consequences. Further, the danger of radioactive leaks
and emissions, whether as functions of the operation of the plant, or
resulting from industrial accidents, terrorist attacks, or other causes, is
greatly magnified.13 9

The Tribunal did not follow Ireland's argument in this regard and
concluded that, under the circumstances of the case, it "[did] not find
that the urgency of the situation requires the prescription of the
provisional measures requested by Ireland, in the short period before
the constitution of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal."14 0 In reaching
this conclusion, the tribunal relied inter alia on the respondent's
argument that "Ireland has failed to supply proof that there will be
either irreparable damage to the rights of Ireland or serious harm to
the marine environment resulting from the operation of the MOX
plant and that, on the facts of this case, the precautionary principle
has no application."141 This finding was later confirmed by the

137.
See id. para. 72 ("[T]he Court recognizes the concerns expressed by
Argentina for the need to protect its natural environment and, in particular, the
quality of the water of the River Uruguay.").
138.
Id. para. 73. The Court stressed:
Argentina has not provided evidence at present that suggests that any
pollution resulting from the commissioning of the mills would be of a character
to cause irreparable damage to the River Uruguay; whereas it is a function of
CARU to ensure the quality of water of the river by regulating and minimizing
the level of pollution; whereas, in any event, the threat of any pollution is not
imminent as the mills are not expected to be operational before August 2007
(Orion) and June 2008 (CMB).
Id. para. 75.
139.
MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), para. 145 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea) (Req. for
Provisional Measures and Statement of Case by Ir. of Nov. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html. Ireland further argued that "the precautionary
principle might usefully inform the assessment by the Tribunal of the urgency of the
measures it is required to take in respect of the operation of the MOX plant." Id. para.
148.
140.
MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.) (Order of Dec. 3, 2001), 41 I.L.M. 405, para. 81
(Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea), available at http://www.itlos.org/casedocuments/2001/
document en_197.pdf.
141.
Id. para. 75.
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decision of the Annex VII Tribunal established to address Ireland's
claim under the UNCLOS.1 4 2
Despite the rejection of the measures requested by the claimants,
both cases illustrate how scientific uncertainty as to the effects of
certain measures could potentially be dealt with by an international
adjudicatory body, even before the merits are fully reviewed. Given
the scientific uncertainties often characterizing environmental issues,
such measures have been requested in several environment-related
cases. 143 Moreover, some environmental agreements specifically
contemplate the prescription of provisional measures. In addition to
Article 290 of UNCLOS,1 44 which was at stake in the MOX Plant
case, examples include Article 31 of the Agreement on Straddling and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,145 and Article 6 of Annex II to the

142.
See MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.) (Order No. 3 of June 24, 2003), paras. 53-55
(Perm.
Ct.
Arb.),
available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/MOX%
200rder%20no3.pdf (finding that Ireland had not presented evidence establishing
harm to the marine environment caused by the operation of the MOX plant).
143.
See Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 1941) (involving an arbitration proceeding between the U.S. and Canada after
complaints that fumes from a British Columbian mining and smelting plant were
causing damage to Washington state); Land Reclamation (Malay. v. Sing.) (Int'l Trib.
L. of the Sea 2003), available at http://www.itlos.org (involving action by Malaysia over
Singapore's land reclamation of the Straights of Johor); Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases
(N.Z. v. Japan, Aus. v. Japan) (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999) (Aug. 27 Order on the
Provisional Measures Req.), available at http://www.itlos.org (involving a dispute
between both Australia and New Zealand with Japan over conservation and
management efforts of Southern Bluefin Tuna).
144.
UNCLOS, supra note 120, arts. 290(1), 290(5).
1. If a dispute has been duly submitted to a court or tribunal which considers
that primafacie it has jurisdiction under this Part or Part XI, section 5, the
court or tribunal may prescribe any provisional measures which it considers
appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the
parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment,
pending the final decision. . . . 5. Pending the constitution of an arbitral
tribunal to which a dispute is being submitted under this section, any court or
tribunal agreed upon by the parties or, failing such agreement within two
weeks from the date of the request for provisional measures, the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or, with respect to activities in the Area, the
Seabed Disputes Chamber, may prescribe, modify or revoke provisional
measures in accordance with this article if it considers that prima facie the
tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction and that the
urgency of the situation so requires. Once constituted, the tribunal to which the
dispute has been submitted may modify, revoke or affirm those provisional
measures, acting in conformity with paragraphs 1 to 4.

Id.
145.
U.N. Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, 6th mtg., July, 24-Aug. 4, 1995, New York, N.Y., Agreement for the

Implementation of the Provisionsof the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea of
10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and High MigratoryFish Stocks, art. 31(2), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37.
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CBD.146 It is also noteworthy that the Optional Rules for Arbitration
of Disputes relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment
adopted in June 2001 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA
Optional Rules), contain a specific provision on interim measures "to
prevent serious harm to the environment." 147 This is interesting
because a number of MEAs refer to the PCA in their dispute
settlement provisions. 148
9.

Evidence

Environmental disputes raise specific challenges with respect to
the gathering and presentation of evidence. The significant scientific
uncertainties involved in the assessment of the environmental
repercussions of a given set of acts often require heavy reliance on

Without prejudice to article 290 of the Convention, the court or tribunal to
which the dispute has been submitted under this Part may prescribe any
provisional measures which it considers appropriate under the circumstances
to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent
damage to the stocks in question, as well as in the circumstances referred to in
article 7, paragraph 5, and article 16, paragraph 2.

Id.
146.
CBD, supra note 42, Annex II, art. 6 ("The arbitral tribunal may, at the
request of one of the parties, recommend essential interim measures of protection.").
Permanent Court of Arbitratrion, OptionalRules for Arbitration of Disputes
147.
Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment, art. 26(1) (June 19, 2001),
available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/ENV%20CONC.pdf [hereinafter PCA
Rules].
Unless the parties otherwise agree the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of
any party and having obtained the views of all the parties, take any interim
measures including provisional orders with respect to the subject-matter of the
dispute it deems necessary to preserve the rights of any party or to prevent
serious harm to the environment falling within the subject-matter of the
dispute.
Id.; see also Dane P. Ratliff, The PCA Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes
Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 887
(2001) (Neth.) (providing commentary on the PCA Optional Rules).
148.
See Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by
the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters to the
1992 Conventions on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes and on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents art. 14,
May 21, 2003, U.N. Doc. ECE[MP.WAT/11-ECE/CP.TEIA/9 (not currently in force)
(allowing for disputes to be submitted to the PCA upon mutual consent of the parties);
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty sched., art. 1, para. 2,
Oct. 4, 2001, 30 I.L.M. 1455, 1470 (referring to the Secretary of the PCA); Convention
on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals art. 13, Jun. 23, 1979, 29
U.S.T. 4647, 1134 U.N.T.S. 97 (same); Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna art. 18, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993
U.N.T.S. 243 (same).
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scientific and technological knowledge in the form of expert
reports. 14 9 Moreover, the results of such reports are often difficult to
appraise by international adjudicatory bodies, not only because the
latter are as a rule composed of lawyers without sufficient scientific
background but also because the results of environmental expert
reports are themselves subject to considerable scientific uncertainty.
This in turn raises the question of the need for an adaptation of the
standard or the burden of proof of environmental risks or damages.
An apposite illustration of these difficulties is offered by the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, before the ICJ.1 50 Hungary sought to
justify its noncompliance with a treaty with Slovakia for the
construction of a system of dams by arguing inter alia that if it had
indeed carried out the works as planned, "the environment-and in
particular the drinking water resources-in the area would have been
exposed to serious dangers."' 5 ' Throughout the proceedings, both
Hungary and Slovakia presented an "impressive amount of scientific
material," as acknowledged by the Court itself, to provide scientific
grounding for their respective positions.152
The situation was
particularly challenging for the Court. As noted by one prominent
commentator, who was also counsel for Hungary in this case, the
judges were not only called to understand the scientific intricacies of
the matter but also to determine the relative merits of the scientific
material presented by each party. 5 3 Eventually, however, the Court
concluded that "it [was] not necessary in order to respond to the
questions put to it in the Special Agreement for it to determine which
of those points of view is scientifically better founded."154 Irrespective
of whether this course of action was justified under the circumstances
of the case or not, such a solution should be seen as an exception

149.
See e.g. Louis Savadogo, Le Recours des JuridictionsInternationales& des
Experts, 50 ANNIJAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 231 (2004) (Fr.) (disucussing
the use of experts and expert reports).
150.
Gabbikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
151.
Id. para. 55.
152.

Id.

153.

Pierre-Marie Dupuy writes in this respect:

Du c6t6 des juges, en effet, mime si l'on doit supposer qu'ils sont prits A tenter
de comprendre un ensemble complexe et correl6 de d6monstrations
scientifiques et techniques, comme c'6tait en l'occurrence le cas, on ne peut que
douter de leur aptitude A 6tre capable d'arbitrer entre cet ensemble dija trds
complexe de consid~rations et celles, tout aussi difficiles, que leur opposera la
partie adverse.
P.-M. Dupuy, L'invocation de l'ltat de ncessit gcologique. Les enseignements tirds
d'une itude de cas, in LA NPCESSITE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 232 (SFDI ed., Pedone
2007) (Fr.). See generally Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual
Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998) (arguing that as scientific theories become
relevant to more cases, they threaten the legitimacy of nonexperts' legal decisions).
154.
Gabaikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 55.
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rather than the rule in environmental disputes, as one can expect
that, in such disputes, the relative merits of the competing scientific
views advanced by the parties will likely be a major point to be
decided by the tribunal.
An interesting technique to provide tribunals with the necessary
scientific support for reaching a decision on such questions is the
appointment by the tribunal of its own experts. Article 289 of
UNCLOS states:
In any dispute involving scientific or technical matters, a court or
tribunal exercising jurisdiction under this section may, at the request of
a party or proprio motu, select in consultation with the parties no fewer
than two scientific or technical experts chosen preferably from the
relevant list prepared in accordance with Annex VIII, article 2, to sit
155
with the court or tribunal but without the right to vote.

A similar provision appears in Article 27(1) of the PCA Optional
Rules, which states:
After having obtained the views of the parties, the arbitral tribunal
may upon notice to the parties appoint one or more experts to report to
it, in writing, on specific issues to be determined by the tribunal. A copy
of the expert's terms of reference, established by the arbitral tribunal,
156
shall be communicated to the parties.

Such an option is also contemplated in other areas of international
adjudication, such as in article 50 of the ICJ Statute, 15 7 Article 13(2)
of World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Bodies
Memorandum,15 8 Article 1133 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 59 Article 27 of the United Nations Commission on

155.
UNCLOS, supra note 120, art. 289.
156.
PCA Rules, supra note 147, art. 27(1).
157.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 50, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055 ("The Court may, at any time, entrust any individual, body, bureau, commission,
or other organization that it may select, with the task of carrying out an enquiry or
giving an expert opinion.").
158.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, art. 13(2),
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts
to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter. With respect to a
factual issue concerning a scientific or other technical matter raised by a party
to a dispute, a panel may request an advisory report in writing from an expert
review group. Rules for the establishment of such a group and its procedures
are set forth in Appendix 4.

Id.
159.
North American Free Trade Agreement ch. 11, art. 1133, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
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International Trade Law Arbitration Rules,16 0 or Article 6 of the
International Bar Association Rules on the Taking of Evidence in
International Commercial Arbitration.161 The specific modalities of
such consultation, including the selection of the expert, the
cooperation of the parties, and the possibility for the parties to submit
comments on the expert report or even subject the expert to oral
cross-examination, are very important for the legitimacy of the end
result.
An alternative technique is the possibility for the tribunal to
request the parties' nontechnical summaries or explanations of the
scientific or technological issues relevant for deciding the dispute.
For instance, Article 24(4) of the PCA Optional Rules provide that
[t]he arbitral tribunal may request the parties jointly or separately to
provide a nontechnical document summarizing and explaining the
background to any scientific, technical or other specialized information
which the arbitral tribunal considers to be necessary to understand
62
fully the matters in dispute.1

Despite the availability of such techniques, the scientific
uncertainties underlying certain environmental disputes are
sometimes such that the normal rules regarding the standard or the
burden of proof appear inadequate.s6 3 The basic rule remains that

Without prejudice to the appointment of other kinds of experts where
authorized by the applicable arbitration rules, a Tribunal, at the request of a
disputing party or, unless the disputing parties disapprove, on its own
initiative, may appoint one or more experts to report to it in writing on any
factual issue concerning environmental, health, safety or other scientific
matters raised by a disputing party in a proceeding, subject to such terms and
conditions as the disputing parties may agree.

Id.
160.
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 27(1), U.N. GAOR, 31st
Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1076) ("The arbitral tribunal may
appoint one or more experts to report to it, in writing, on specific issues to be
determined by the tribunal. A copy of the expert's terms of reference, established by the
arbitral tribunal, shall be communicated to the parties.").

161.

Int'l Bar Assoc. [IBA], IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International

CommercialArbitration,art. 6(1), IBA Doc. 131-3 (June 1, 1999).
The Arbitral Tribunal, after having consulted with the Parties, may appoint
one or more independent Tribunal-Appointed Experts to report to it on specific
issues designated by the Arbitral Tribunal. The Arbitral Tribunal shall
establish the terms of reference for any Tribunal-Appointed Expert report after
having consulted with the Parties. A copy of the final terms of reference shall
be sent by the Arbitral Tribunal to the Parties.

Id.
162.
PCA Rules, supra note 147, art. 24(4).
163.
For a comparative discussion of these two concepts and the applicable rules
in international adjudication, see C. Santulli, Droit du contentieux international,paras.
846-68, E. Truilh6-Marengo, Les rigles relatives & la preuve: quelle place pour
l'incertitude scientifique?, in DROIT DE L'ORGANISATION MONDIALE DU COMMERCE ET

480

VANDERBIL T]OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 431437

"[e]ach party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to
support its claim or defense." 164 However, the burden of proof could
potentially be reversed. Such was the proposal of the European
Communities in connection with the burden of establishing the
applicability of a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Article XX exception to accommodate trade measures adopted
pursuant to a specific mandate in a MEA.1 65 Another possibility is
to maintain the burden of proof on the party making a claim but
relaxing the standard for proving the claim. This was the approach
followed by the WTO Appellate Body in EC Hormones and is arguably
also the approach taken to date by the ITLOS in assessing requests
for provisional measures. 166 Still another approach is to shift the
burden of proof by prior agreement of the parties.167 For instance,
the dumping of industrial waste at sea is banned unless it is
previously established that it will not cause harm to the
environment. 6 8 This latter approach comes close to the concept of
facilitated liability, discussed next.
10. Facilitated Liability
The term "facilitated liability" refers to a number of hypotheses
where the claimant's task in establishing that the respondent is at
fault or in breach of an obligation is facilitated. Unlike international

PROTECTION DE LENVIRONNEMENT 443-60 (Sandrine Maljean-Dubois ed.), and LE
DROIT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT COMME EXEMPLE DE LA MONDIALISATION DES CONCEPTS
JURIDIQUES: PLACE
ET
ROLE
DES
JURIDICTIONS INTERNATIONALES
ET

CONSTITUTIONNELLES 26 (Sandrine Maljean-Dubois ed., 2008), available at
http://www.gip-recherche-justice.fr/IMG/pdf/170-RFMaljeanDubois DroitEnviron.pdf.
164.
PCA Rules, supra note 147, art. 24(1).
165.
See Comm. on Trade & Env't, Note by the Secretariat: Multilateral
EnvironmentalAgreements (MEAS) and WTO Rules; ProposalsMade in the Committee
on Trade and Environment (CTE) from 1995-2002, pt. II, para. 7, WT/CTE/W/170 (Oct.
19, 2000).
166.
European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products,
paras. 97-109, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (allocating burden of
proof in proceedings under the SPS ageement); see also Land Reclamation by Singapore
in and Around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.), para. 96 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea
2003), available at http://www.itlos.org (prescribing provisional measures based on the
consideration that "the land reclamation works may have adverse effects on the marine
environment"); Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan, Aus. v. Japan), paras. 7990 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999) (Aug. 27 Order on the Provisional Measures Req.),
available at http://www.itlos.org (acknowledging significant "scientific uncertainty"
regarding the evidence presented, but nonetheless finding provisional measures
justified).
See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 37, at 158-59 (discussing the risks involving
167.
the burden of proof).
See id. at 159 (discussing the 1996 Protocol to the London Dumping
168.
Convention and art. 4 of the OSPAR Convention).
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responsibility, international liability is not premised on fault or
breach of an obligation, and it requires proof of damage. The
scientific uncertainties raised by the complex ecological processes
linking a set of acts to the occurrence of environmental damage can
be dealt with, as previously discussed, by shifting the burden of proof
of such damage or relaxing the applicable standard of proof.
However, even when such damage is sufficiently established, the
actor behind the conduct under review may argue that it took every
reasonable step to prevent the damage and that, therefore, it is
neither subjectively at fault not objectively in breach of an
obligation.169 Scientific uncertainty is relevant in this regard because
what is reasonably required, either subjectively or objectively, by an
obligation of prevention depends upon the understanding of the links
between certain acts and the environmental damage at stake. A way
to handle the additional challenges derived from such scientific
uncertainty at the reparation stage is to set up a facilitated liability
regime.
Establishing liability may be facilitated by adjusting or
eliminating the need to prove fault or breach. A possible adjustment
could take the form of a shift in the burden of proof of due diligence
from the claimant to the respondent. Thus, unless the respondent
establishes that it acted with all due diligence, it will be held liable
for the damage caused by its acts. Reference to the International
Law Commision 2001 Articles on prevention of transboundary
environmental damage (ILC Articles on Prevention) and its 2006
Principles on the allocation of loss for such damage (ILC Principles)
can illustrate this point.170 Under these latter, states would not be
liable if they can prove that they have complied with their obligations
of prevention, although they may be required to set up a
compensation system.17 1 Instead, the ILC Principles channel liability
169.
See, e.g., BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 37, at 215 ("The decisive consideration is
that unless the rule of international law which has been violated specifically envisages
malice or culpable negligence, the rules of international law do not contain a general
floating requirement of malice or culpable negligence as a condition of responsibility."
(quoting Jiminez de Arichaga) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

170.

See Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the

Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session, ch. v.e.1, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006) [hereinafter ILC
Principles] (reproducing the text of the draft principles as adopted by the International
Law Commission at its fifty-eighth session); Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the

Internatinal Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, ch. v.e.1, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (reproducing text of the 2001 draft articles regarding activities that
pose a significant risk of causing transboundary harm).
See ILC Principles, supra note 170, at 111. The introductory commentary to
171.
the ILC Principles notes:
[E]ven if the relevant State fully complies with its prevention obligations,
under international law, accidents or other incidents may nonetheless occur
and have transboundary consequences that cause harm and serious loss to
other States and their nationals.. . . It is important, as the preamble records,
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to the operator of hazardous activities or, more precisely, direct states
to adopt measures channeling liability to the operator in a manner
that does not require proof of fault. 7 2
Leaving aside the
controversial question of the legal status of this document, what is
important for this discussion is that the system set out in the ILC
Principles is one of strict liability. In case of transboundary damage
arising from the activities of a private operator or the state (as an
operator), 7 3 the victims would not need to prove either fault of the
operator or breach by the state (as an operator) of its due diligence
obligations. The underlying rationale of this advantage given to the
potential claimants is explained as follows in the Commentary to the
ILC Principles:
Hazardous and ultrahazardous activities, the subject of the present
draft principles, involve complex operations and carry with them
certain inherent risks of causing significant harm. In such matters, it is
widely recognized that it would be unjust and inappropriate to make
the claimant shoulder a heavy burden of proof of fault or negligence in
respect of highly complex technological activities whose risks and
174
operation the concerned industry closely guards as a secret.

However, the potential claimants still face the burden of proving
causation. As noted in the Commentary:
Strict liability may alleviate the burden that victims may otherwise
have in proving fault of the operator but it does not eliminate the
difficulties involved in establishing the necessary causal connection of
the damage to the source of the activity. The principle of causation is
175
linked to questions of foreseeability and proximity or direct loss.

The Commentary is not clear on the extent to which the operator may
avoid strict liability by invoking certain defences. Any limitations
must, in any case, be consistent with Article 3 of the ILC Principles to

that those who suffer harm or loss as a result of such incidents involving
hazardous activities are not left to carry those losses and are able to obtain
prompt and adequate compensation. These draft principles establish the means
by which this may be accomplished.
Id. However, Principle 4(5) of the ILC Principles contemplates the possibility that a
state may be led to grant compensation: "[in the event that the measures under the
preceding paragraphs are insufficient to provide adequate compensation, the State of
origin should also ensure that additional financial resources are made available." Id. at
151. It is, however, for states to adopt sufficient measures to limit their liability in such
cases. Id. at 151-52.
172.
See id. at 151, princ. 4(2) ("These measures [to be adopted by states] should
include the imposition of liability on the operator or, where appropriate, other person
or entity. Such liability should not require proof of fault.").
173.
The Commentary to the ILC Principles notes in this regard that "an
operator may be a public or private entity. It is envisaged that a State could be an
operator for purposes of the present definition." Id. at 140, para. 33.
174.
Id. at 156, para. 13.
175.
Id. at 157, para. 16.
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ensure prompt and adequate compensation for victims and to protect
the environment.
The examples of strict liability channeled to the operator of the
activity are numerous and include many treaties on liability for
marine pollution, nuclear accidents, or other hazardous activities. 1 76
The hypothesis of strict liability imposed on the state is much rarer
and only appears to be contemplated for activities that were, at least
initially, viewed as closely linked to governmental action.1 77 The
main example of this more radical hypothesis is Article VII of the
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, which states:
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching
of an object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is
launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to
the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its
component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including
178
the moon and other celestial bodies.

Article 7 of the Outer Space Treaty is implemented by a Liability
Convention that provides for the absolute liability of the "launching
State" (i.e., a state that launches or procures the launching of a space
object, or from whose territory or facility a space object is launched)
"for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or
to aircraft in flight."17 9 The allocation of the burden to prove
causation is not entirely clear. It appears that such burden is on the
claimant, but the launching state may be exonerated from its

176.
See Jutta Brunde, Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on International
Liability Regimes as Tools for Environmental Protection, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 351
(2004) (outlining the international community's efforts to establish agreements to
ensure perpetrators of transboundary environmental harm are held liable).
See Alexandre Kiss & Dinah Shelton, Strict Liability in International
177.
Environmental Law, in LAW OF THE SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES: LIBER AMIcORUM JUDGE THOMAS A. MENSAH 1131, 1151 (Tafsir Malik
Ndiaye & Riudiger Wolfrum eds., 2007) (Neth.) ("As a rule, strict liability is linked with
hazardous activities and States draft laws or regulations to identify such activities.").
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
178.
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. VII,
opened for signatureJan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3.
179.
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects
art. 2, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187. The liability standard is
different for damage caused to other space objects or persons traveling within such
objects:
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the earth
to a space object of one launching State or to persons or property on board such
a space object by a space object of another launching State, the latter shall be
liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is
responsible.
Id. art. 3.

484

VANDERBIL T/OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 43:437

absolute liability if it proves either of two circumstances that amount,
in fact, to a concurrent cause, namely gross negligence or intent from
the claimant. 8 0

III. TACKLING SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY IN PRACTICE:
THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME

A. Introductory Observations
Reference to the climate change regime (CCR) can illustrate
several of the techniques reviewed so far. The choice of the CCR to
analyze how these techniques operate in practice rests upon several
considerations.
First, the redesign of the CCR currently is perhaps the foremost
topic in international affairs, from the perspective of both
industrialized and developing countries, and the significant divide
between these two broad categories is at least in part characterized
by their different level of scientific and technological development.
Second, the issue of climate change embodies the complexity and
breadth of what has been referred to as "second generation"
environmental issues.18 1 This is largely because the substantial
scientific uncertainties characterizing different dimensions of the
problem, some of which (such as the role of clouds, aerosols, and
vegetation in the climate system) have been partly elucidated only in
recent years.
Third, the international CCR is not exactly a "treaty-based
regime" and may potentially further distance itself from such a
characterization depending upon the outcome of the Copenhagen
conference. 182 Indeed, at the very least, the CCR includes the

180.

Id. art. VI(1). Article VI provides:

Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, exoneration from
absolute liability shall be granted to the extent that a launching State
establishes that the damage has resulted either wholly or partially from gross
negligence or from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage on the
part of a claimant State or of natural or juridical persons it represents.

Id.
181.
See Elevation of the Environmental ProtectionAgency to Department Level
Status: Hearing on H.R. 37 and H.R. 2138 Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy,
National Resources and Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. on Government Reform,
108th Cong. 6 (2003) (statement of Janice Mazurak, Director of Innovation and the
Environment, Progressive Policy Institute) ("We call these 'second generation'
environmental policies to distinguish them from the first generation of landmark
environmental laws and regulations set in place by Congress in the 1960s and 1970s.").
182.
See News Release, IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, Copenhagen
Climate Summit: Copenhagen Accord A Step in Right Direction, But Insufficient (Dec.
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interactions between, on the one hand, the bodies and rules of the
UNFCCC and its protocols, and, on the other hand, their loosely
defined relationship with the work of the IPCC. In the future, the
regime may potentially involve bilateral or selective multilateral
"dialogues" among large emitters.
Fourth, the CCR provides particularly interesting examples of
how the techniques reviewed operate at the four different stages of
regime development identified in the second part of this Article. This
is also why the discussion in subpart (B) below is structured in four
subsections, each dealing with each stage of regime development.

B. Scientific Uncertainty in the Climate Change Regime
1.

Advocacy

Arguably, there is no single event or moment that marks the
transition from the perception of climate change as an uncertain
phenomenon to the present comprehension of the risk accompanying
Such transition can more accurately be
climate change.i8 3
characterized as a process involving both scientific and political
components linked by a surge of media attention often relating to a
specific event, such as a catastrophe or the publication of a report.
The purpose here is not to provide an account of such process, which
has already received sustained analysis.1 84 Rather, it is to illustrate
the part played by precautionary reasoning in the emergence of the
two main pillars of the CCR, the IPCC and the UNFCCC treaty
system.
In 1979, much as a result of the scientific uncertainty
surrounding the interactions between the atmosphere and the oceans
and vegetation, the International Council for Science (ICSU) and the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) organized a World
Climate Conference (WCC) to address the need for effective
interdisciplinary discussions among climate experts.18 5 The WCC
resulted in the creation of a World Climate Programme, with various
branches including a World Climate Research Programme (WCRP).

22, 2009), available at http://www.iucnredlist.org/news/climate-change-summitcopenhagen (quoting Neville Ash, Head of IUCN's Ecosystem Management
Programme, who commented on the strategy to form a post-2012 climate change
regime and explained that "[v]ulnerable communities across the globe already suffer
from the impacts of climate change and so we need to ensure that progress to date
results in a legally-binding deal on mitigation and adaptation as soon as possible").
See supra text accompanying notes 2-7.
183.
See, e.g., WEART, supra note 1 (providing an in-depth analysis of this
184.
transition).
World Meteorological Org., Third Announcement, WORLD CLIMATE
185.
CONFERENCE-3, May 2009, at 4, available at http://www.wmo.int/wcc3/documents/
wcc3_3rd annoucementEN.pdf.
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The WCRP was the successor of a previous research programme
jointly organized by the ICSU and the WMO in 1967, mainly in order
to put pressure on governments to provide funds for weather
prediction as well as climate research.186 The WCRP inherited much
of the Programme's structure, including the administrative support
from the WMO and an independent scientific planning committee.1 8 7
As noted by Weart, the cautious concluding statement of the WCC
that an increase in carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere
may possibly result in significant and perhaps major changes in the
global-scale climate "was hardly news, and it caught little public or
political attention." 8 8 Arguably, by the late 1970s, neither the
scientific knowledge of climate change nor precautionary reasoning
was sufficient to prompt regulation at the international level.
This changed considerably during the 1980s, especially in the
second half of the decade. In 1983, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency issued a report drawing attention to the
potentially catastrophic consequences of a rise in global temperature,
which should no longer be considered "a theoretical problem but . .. a
threat whose effects will be felt within a few years."' 8 9 This report
caught sufficient media attention to direct the interest of US
politicians to the matter.1 90 From an international perspective, a
series of scientific meetings were organized during the 1980s under
the aegis of the ICSU, the WMO, and UNEP, focusing on different
aspects of climate change. In particular, at a 1985 meeting held in
Villach, Austria, experts from a number of both industrialized and
developing countries reached a consensus on the possibility that
human activity may cause global warming, which could in turn have
very serious consequences.
The final report, drafted by the
influential Swedish scientist Bert Bolin, who had chaired the 1967
joint ICSU-WMO research programme, stated that "[a]s a result of
the increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases, it is now believed
that in the first half of the next century a rise of global mean
temperature could occur which is greater than any in man's
history."191 As the document makes clear, this statement was based

186.
WEART, supra note 1 at 104-05, 145.
187.
ROBERT G. FLEAGLE, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: INTERACTIONS OF
SCIENCE, POLICY, AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 176 (1994).
188.
WEART, supra note 1 at 112.
189.
Id. at 141 (citing STEPHEN SEIDEL & DALE KEYES, CAN WE DELAY A
GREENHOUSE WARMING?, at ix, 7 (2nd ed. 1983)).

190. Timothy O'Donnell, Of Loaded Dice and Heated Arguments: Putting the
Hansen-MichaelsGlobal Warming Debate in Context, 14 Soc. EPISTEMIOLOGY 109, 113
(2000).
191.

U.N. Env. Programme, Co-ordinating Comm. on the Ozone Layer, Related

Activities to the Work of the Co-ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer Being
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on a consensus reached by scientists from twenty-nine developed and
developing countries.19 2 Scientific uncertainty was starting to turn
into risk assessment. The document did not provide much detail on
different scenarios, but did refer to possible errors in its
predictions.1 9 3 Moreover, throughout the 1980s, governments started
to fund what came to be known as "impact studies," namely
assessments of the social and economic impact of climate change.19 4
However, scientific consensus was not necessarily sufficient, as
such, to prompt concrete political action. Yet the efforts of the ICSU,
WMO, and UNEP continued, and in 1986, they jointly established an
Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG). The efforts conducted
under these organizations, in a variety of other contexts, proved to be
extremely useful in organizing a framework for scientific
interdisciplinary exchanges among scientists. A major scientific
breakthrough resulting from such interdisciplinary exchanges was
the "discovery of a 'hole' in the ozone layer over Antarctica" in
1985.19s Such discovery prompted the strengthening of the weak
regime initially contemplated in the 1985 Vienna Convention by the
adoption of the 1987 Montreal Protocol.196 The Protocol contributed
in turn to grounding the scientific processes taking place in the
atmosphere and gathering momentum for the development of a
regime dealing with climate change. It must be noted, in this vein,
that the main substances targeted by the Montreal Protocol, namely
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), had also been identified in the Villach
statement as a Greenhouse Gas (GHG) responsible for the increase in
global temperatures.' 9 7 The following year, three important events
focusing specifically on climate change occurred.

Implemented by UNEP, Annex II, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CCOL/8/5 (Feb. 19,
(reproducing the text of the 1985 UNEP/WMO/ICSU Conference Statement).
192.
Id.
193.
Id.

1986)

The most advanced experiments with general circulation models of the climatic
system show increases of the global mean equilibrium surface temperature for
a doubling of the atmospheric C02 concentration, or equivalent, of between 1.5
and 4.5*C. Because of the complexity of the climatic system and the
imperfections of the models, particularly with respect to ocean-atmosphere
interactions and clouds, values outside this range cannot be excluded. The
realization of such changes will be slowed by the inertia of the oceans, the delay
in reaching the mean equilibrium temperatures corresponding to doubled
greenhouse gas concentrations is expected to be a matter of decades

Id.
194.
WEART, supra note 1, at 143.
195.
Id. at 147.
196.
Winfried Lang, Is the Ozone Depletion Regime a Model for an Emerging
Regime on Global Warming?, 9 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 161, 164-65 (1991).
197.
Edith Brown Weiss, Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity, and
InternationalLaw, 9 VT. J INT'L L. 615, 615-16 (2008).
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The first was a conference held in Toronto, Canada, as an
extension of the Villach workshops.' 9 8 It was a meeting of expert
scientists, as opposed to government representatives. The final
report not only confirmed the scientific consensus that was slowly
taking shape, but also, for the first time, called for governments to set
specific targets for the reduction of GHG, following the Montreal
Protocol's model.' 9 9
The second event was the establishment of the IPCC by the joint
initiative of UNEP and the WMO in 1988.200 The document laying
out the IPCC's mandate, namely UN General Assembly Resolution
43/53, of December 6, 1988, expressly referred to the momentum
created by the Villach meeting, the Montreal Protocol, the initiatives
of UNEP and the ICSU, and the work of the WMO towards the
organization of a Second World Climate Conference.2 0 1 It was
premised on the precautionary "concern that the emerging evidence
indicates that continued growth in atmospheric concentrations of
'greenhouse' gases could produce global warming with an eventual
rise in sea levels, the effects of which could be disastrous for mankind
if timely steps are not taken at all levels." 202 It was this same
instrument that called upon the Secretary General of the WMO and
UNEP's Executive Director, through the IPCC, to proceed to a
comprehensive review of scientific evidence regarding climate change
and inter alia to "the identification and possible strengthening of
relevant existing international legal instruments having a bearing on
climate [and e]lements for inclusion in a possible future international
convention on climate." 203
These developments in turn prompted a third process, which
eventually led to the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992. The political
process was difficult from the beginning. A large part of the mandate
of the conference held in Ottawa in February 1989 to consider the
elements of a future convention was indeed to "identify areas where,
for legal, technical or scientific reasons, a consensus may not be
achievable and to suggest ways to overcome such obstacles." 204 In

198.
Jennifer Woodward, Turning Down the Heat: What United States Laws Can
Do to Help Ease Global Warming, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 203, 223 n.153 (1991).
199.
WEART, supra note 1, at 149.
200.
See Jack Fitzgerald, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change:
Taking the First Steps towards a Global Response, 14 S. ILL. U. L. J. 231 (1989-1990).
201.
G.A. Res. 43/53, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/53 (Dec. 6, 1988).
202.
Id.
203.
Id. paras. 10(a), (d)-(e).
204.
The World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for
Global Security, Toronto, Can., June 27-30, 1988, Protection of the Atmosphere:

Statement of the Meeting of Legal and Policy Experts, (Feb. 22, 1989), in PRUE TAYLOR,
AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: RESPONDING TO CHALLENGES OF
CLIMATE CHANGE, app. C, at 360 (1998).

SCIENTIFICUNCERTAINTY IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

2010/

489

addition, the conclusion of the first assessment report of the IPCC left
enough margin for economically driven scientific counter-arguments,
funded by special interest groups from industry, particularly the
fossil energy sector, such as the Global Climate Coalition. Indeed, the
IPCC could not exclude the notion that the increase in temperature
could "be largely due to natural variability." 205
Notwithstanding the real uncertainties underlying the processes
at the roots of climate change and their impact on human societies or
the pressure exerted by interest groups, the UNFCCC was eventually
adopted largely on a precautionary basis, as acknowledged in its
The negotiating history of this provision is
Article 3(3).206
During the sessions of the
illuminating in this regard.
intergovernmental negotiating committee (INC), the representative of
the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS), which was the
staunchest advocate for the introduction of the precautionary
principle in the text of the Convention, eloquently noted: "we do not
have the luxury of waiting for conclusive proof, as some have
suggested in the past. The proof, we fear, will kill us." 207
2.

Design

Another important issue discussed at the INC concerns the
design features of the regime envisioned and, more specifically, the
strategic choice between a "framework" and a "substantive"
convention. 208 The two basic precedents for the CCR were the
LRTAP Convention and the Ozone Convention. In both cases, the
approach followed was one consisting of a framework text to be
completed by protocols. As already discussed, this approach has the
advantage of catalyzing consensus on a broad text even when some of
the states engaged in the process have yet to accept the need for
regulation from a scientific perspective. As Bodansky noted,
[s]tates can begin to address a problem without waiting for a consensus
to emerge on appropriate response measures, or even before there is
agreement that a problem exists .... For example, when both the ECE
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention (LRTAP) and the
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna
Ozone Convention) were adopted, some states remained unconvinced of
the need for action. Nevertheless, even skeptical states acquiesced in
the adoption of these conventions, since the conventions did not commit

205.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE
IPCC SCIENTIFIc ASSESSMENT xii (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1990).

206.
207.

UNFCCC, supra note 40, art. 3(3).
Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451, 503 n.317 (1993) (quoting Robert F.
Van Lierop, Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Chairman of the
Delegation of Vanuatu, Statement to the Plenary Session of the INC/FCCC,at 3, Feb.
5, 1991 (on file with Bodansky)).
208.
Id. at 493-96.
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them to any specific measures. Later, when the scientific evidence
became stronger, protocols could be adopted more quickly, since the
framework conventions had cleared away many of the preliminary
209
procedural and institutional issues"

In the case of the CCR the existence of an ongoing body, such as the
IPCC, specifically devoted to the assessment of the evidence of
climate change made the situation even more complex. Some states
considered that the numerous initiatives already taken in the area of
climate change, and particularly the work of the IPCC, was a
sufficient basis for adopting a more ambitious convention, with clear
substantive content, including commitments. 210 The divergence of
views was apparent in the work of the INC. Countries such as
Germany proposed the adoption of specific substantive measures on
mitigation and adaptation, whereas countries such as the United
States favored a substantively diluted but procedurally more
ambitious text, contemplating a sophisticated architecture for future
consensus, including a scientific advisory body. 211 The details here
are less important than the overall tension between substantive and
procedural ambition, and the design features associated with each
approach. Eventually, this divergence resulted in a compromise
framework convention, containing both substantive and procedural
provisions, illustrated by provisions such as Article 4 (commitments),
Article 7 (COP powers), Article 9 (subsidiary body for scientific and
technological advice, or SBSTA), or Article 17 of the UNFCCC
(adoption of protocols). 212
These design features played an important role in both the
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and, more recently, in the
structuring of the process leading to the Copenhagen conference in
December 2009. The framework-protocol approach and the SBSTA
provided the UNFCCC with increased reactivity to the periodical
review of scientific evidence on climate change performed by the
IPCC. Between these two pillars of the CCR, there is a sort of
informal cyclical process. Weart noted that
[r]oughly twice a decade, the IPCC would analyze the most recent peerreviewed research and issue a consensus statement about the prospects
for climate change. That would lay a foundation for international
negotiations, which would establish guidelines for individual national
policies. Further moves would await the results of further research.
Thus, after governments responded to the Rio convention (with
inaction, as it happened), it was the scientists' turn. They pursued
research problems as usual, published the results in journals as usual,
and discussed technicalities in conferences as usual, but to officialdom

209.
210.

Id. at 494.
Id. at 495.

211.

Id. at 496.

212.

Id. at 505-50.
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that was all in preparation for the next IPCC report, scheduled for
1995.213

The ongoing research the IPCC conducted, which eventually led to
the adoption of the Second Assessment Report in 1995,214 prompted
another legal development. Indeed, in March 1995, the first COP of
the UNFCCC discussed the issue of the adequacy of the commitments
contemplated in Article 4(2)(a) and (b) in the light of recent scientific
evidence. The result was the adoption of COP Decision 1/CP.1, better
known as the "Berlin Mandate,"2 15 which calls for the strengthening
of the commitments of Annex I countries "through the adoption of a
protocol or another legal instrument" and effectively led to the
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol two years later. 216 The Berlin
Mandate is a clear illustration of the interaction between the
sophisticated procedural framework laid out in the UNFCCC and
scientific advancement.
Another illustration of this mechanism is provided by the
"negotiations round" prompted by the IPCC Fourth Assessment
Report issued in November 2007.217 This time, the assessment of the
IPCC was much more precise with respect to (a) the evidence of global
warming; (b) the importance of human activities as a cause; and (c)
the impacts of global warming. The IPCC Summary for Policymakers
confidently stated that "[w]arming of the climate system is
unequivocal" and that "[m]ost of the observed increase in global
average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to
the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations."2 18 The
work of the IPCC clearly shows the importance of turning uncertainty
into risk for regulatory purposes. 219 As Edith Brown Weiss noted:
"The Fourth Assessment's temperature analysis is much more
detailed and sophisticated than the earlier reports. It includes six
separate scenario models, each with its own best estimate and range
of temperature increases." 220 The conclusions of the IPCC were very
seriously taken into account at the UNFCCC COP held in December
2007, in Bali, Indonesia. The result was the adoption of a new

213.
WEART, supra note 1 at 162.
214.
INTERGOVERNMENATL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1994:
RADIATIVE FORCING OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND AN EVALUATION OF THE IPCC IS92
EMISSION SCENARIOS (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1995).
215.
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Mar. 28-Apr. 7, 1995,

Berlin, F.R.G., Report of the Conference of the Partieson its First Session, add., pt. 2, at
4, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (June 6, 1995).
216.
Id.
217.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT (2007).
218.
Id. at 30, 39.
219.
Id. at 30.
220.
Edith Brown Weiss, Preface to the Twentieth Anniversary Issue, 20 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 521, 523 (2008).
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mandate, usually referred to as the Bali Roadmap. 221 We do not
intend to focus here on the different components of the Bali Roadmap,
but only to illustrate how two of the techniques reviewed in the
second part of this Article are being deployed to adapt to new
scientific evidence.
After the IPCC's Fourth Assessment, it became clear that the
Kyoto commitments, even if fully respected, were insufficient to
attain the objective set in Article 2 of the UNFCCC, namely "to
achieve . . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the

atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system." 2 22 Mainly for political reasons,
the process was divided into two main avenues. The first avenue
focused on amending the Kyoto Protocol to increase and enhance the
commitments undertaken by Annex I countries. The efforts in this
direction were entrusted to an Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWGKp). 223 The second avenue, which is in fact the one established by
the so-called Bali Action Plan, focused instead on the adoption of a
wholly new protocol at Copenhagen.
This second process was
entrusted to an Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative
Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA). 224 Interestingly, as part of
this second process, the COP entrusted its scientific advisory body,
the SBSTA, to undertake a "program of work on methodological
issues" in connection with reduced emissions from deforestation and
degradation (REDD) and issue recommendations for consideration by
the COP in its subsequent session. 22 5 So far, the two processes,
which were reconducted in Copenhagen in December 2009, have
made limited progress. By June 2009 the UNFCCC secretariat had
received twelve proposals for the amendment of the Kyoto Protocol in

221.

See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 3-15, 2007, Bali,

Indon., Report of the Conference of the Partieson its Thirteenth Session, add., U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (March 14, 2008) [hereinafter Bali Report] (developing
strategies and methods for implementing plans to improve environmental conditions).
222.
Id. add., at 3, art. 2 (acknowledging that "deep cuts in global emissions will
be required to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention and emphasizing the
urgency to address climate change as indicated in the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change").
223.
Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol, Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the PartiesServing as the
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session, add., pt. 2, at 3, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2006).
224.
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the Partiesat its
Eleventh Session, add., pt. 2, at 3, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2005/5/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2006).
225.
Bali Report, supranote 221, at 8.
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accordance with its Articles 20 and 21,226 including one from the
European Community and another from 37 non-Annex I countries
(including Brazil, China, and India),2 27 and five proposals for the
adoption of a new protocol under Article 17 of the UNFCCC,
including one from the United States.22 8 These proposals, none of
which was eventually retained in the Copenhagen meeting, provide
nevertheless a good illustration of how the procedural sophistication
of the framework may compensate for what appeared initially as a
disappointing regime from a substantive point of view. The design
features of the CCR help it adapt to scientific progress in the
understanding of climate change.
3.

Implementation

The CCR also provides interesting illustrations of some of the
legal techniques focusing on the implementation stage of regime
development.
These techniques are perhaps the most widely
discussed components of the CCR in the IEL literature.22 9

226.
See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Ad Hoc Working
Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol,
Documentation
to
Facilitate Negotiations Among
Parties, U.N.
Doc.
FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/10/Add.1 (Dec. 15, 2009) (providing a compilation of proposals to
amend the Kyoto Protocol); U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Ad Hoc
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto
Protocol, Documentation to Facilitate Negotiations Among Parties, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/10/Add.2 (July 1, 2005) (advocating amendment to the various
articles of the Kyoto Protocol).
227.
Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties of the Kyoto
Protocol, Proposal from Algeria, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde,
China, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Gambia, Ghana, India,
Indonesia, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia

and

Zimbabwe

for

an Amendment

to
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Kyoto

Protocol, U.N.

Doc.

FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/7 (June 15, 2009); Conference of the Parties Serving as the
Meeting of the Parties of the Kyoto Protocol, Proposalfrom the Czech Republic and the
EuropeanCommission on Behalf of the European Community and its Member States for
an Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/2 (June 11, 2009).
228.
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Dec. 7-18, 2009, Draft Implementing Agreement Under the

Convention Preparedby the Government of the United States of America for Adoption at
the Fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties,U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/7 (June
6, 2009).
229.

See, e.g., LEGAL ASPECTS OF CARBON TRADING: KYOTO, COPENHAGEN AND

BEYOND (David Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds., 2009) (discussing the application of
the Kyoto Flexibility Mechanisms and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme to issues
surrounding carbon finance); LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

MECHANISMs (David Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds., 2005) (providing practical
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Of particular interest is the clean development mechanism
(CDM) established in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol as a flexibility
mechanism to achieve compliance with quantified commitments and
a tool for technology transfer to developing countries. A recent report
analyzing sixty-three CDM projects registered by January 1, 2006,
reached the following conclusions:
Technology originates from outside the host country in almost 50% of
the evaluated projects. In the projects in which the technology
originates from outside the host country, 80% use technology from the
European Union. Technologies used in non-C02 greenhouse gas and
wind energy projects, and a substantial share of the hydropower
projects, use technology from outside the host country, but biogas,
agricultural and biomass projects mainly use local technology. The
associated investment value with the CDM projects that transferred
technology is estimated to be around 470 million Euros, with about 390
230
coming from the EU.

Another recent report analyzing a larger number of.projects (3,296)
reaches conclusions that seem consistent with the finding above:
Roughly 36% of the projects accounting for 59% of the annual emission
reductions claim to involve technology transfer. Technology transfer is
more common for larger projects and projects with foreign participants.
Technology transfer is very heterogeneous across project types and
usually involves both knowledge and equipment. The technology
originates mostly from Japan, Germany, the USA, France, and Great
Britain. The rate of technology transfer is significantly higher than
average for several host countries, including Bolivia, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam and significantly lower
than average for Brazil, China, and India. As the number of projects
increases, technology transfer occurs beyond the individual projects.
This is observed for several project types in China and Brazil. For most
project types, project developers appear to have a choice among a
231
number of domestic and/or foreign technology suppliers.

Thus, there is some evidence that, aside from its operation as a
flexibility implementation mechanism, the CDM is also contributing
(although perhaps insufficiently) to the transfer of technology to
developing countries, which in turn fosters compliance by these latter
countries with their (loose) obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.
Other "managerial compliance" techniques would include, for
instance, technology transfer through the Subsidiary Body on
Implementation (SBI), 232 the financial . assistance mechanisms

230.
H.C. DE CONINCK ET AL., TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE CLEAN
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 50 (2007).
231.
STEPHEN SERES, ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN CDM PROJECTS 1
(2008).
232.
See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, Kyoto, Japan, Dec. 1-11, 1997, Report of the Conference of the
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available through the World Bank's Global Environmental Facility or
the Adaptation Fund currently being set up, 233 or the use of COP
decisions to revise the substantive obligations arising out of the Kyoto
Protocol. 234 Other techniques discussed above are, at least for the
time being, less relevant from the purpose of dealing with scientific
uncertainty. This would be the case of the non-compliance procedure
developed through COP decisions on the basis of Article 18 of the
Kyoto Protocol, 235 to the extent that only Annex I (developed and
transitional) countries have undertaken quantified commitments and
such countries are as a rule less challenged by the scientific and
technological requirements for complying with their obligations under
the CCR. 236 It remains however relevant in connection with GHG
inventorying and reporting obligations.
Another legal technique underlying this latter mechanism,
namely regime development through law-making treaty bodies, is
also relevant for our purpose. An interesting example of how this
technique may operate is given by the decision proposals put forward
by the Chair of the AWG-KP in a May 2009 document compiling

Parties on its Third Session, add., pt. 2, at 39-40, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1
(Mar. 25, 1998) (calling for the furtherance of technology transfer activities).
233.
The World Bank, News & Broadcasts, Environment, http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAINEWS/0,,contentMDK:20036126pagePK:64257043piPK-437376t
heSitePK'4607,00.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
234.
See Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Bonn, F.R.G., June 1-12, 1999, A Text on Other Issues

Outlined in Document FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/8,

U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/8

(May 14, 2009) [hereinafter Other Issues] (discussing possible actions to be taken by
Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol); Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol, Poznan, Pol., Dec. 1-10,

2008, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I
Parties under the Kyoto Protocol on its Resumed Sixth Session, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/A/AWG/2008/8 (Feb. 4, 2009) (analyzing the various methodologies for
amending the Kyoto Protocol to aid Annex I Parties).
235.
This procedure is based on the work of a joint working group (JWG)
established in COP-4, 1998, which led to the negotiations in COP-6 and COP-7 in 2001.
UNFCCC, Kyoto
Protocol:
Compliance,
Background,
http://unfcc.int/kyotoprotocol/compliance/background/items/3026.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). After the
Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005, the COP-11/CMP-1 approved and adopted
the project with essentially the same content as before (Decision -/CMP.1). United
Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 11 and CMP 1), http://unfccc.int/meetings/
cop_11/items/3394.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2010). As the compliance mechanism
entitled the "Enforcement Branch" of the "Compliance Committee" to adopt binding
measures, the mechanism should have required ratification by the State parties, in
accordance with art. 18 of the Protocol, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 37 I.L.M. 22, art. 18 (1998). The situation
has so far remained ambiguous, but has not prevented the mechanism from operating
in practice.
236.
See IETA, Climate Change: International Policy & Negotiations, Annex
I/Non-Annex I, http://www.ieta.org/ietalwww/pages/index.php?IdSiteTree =1254 (last
visited Mar. 9, 2010) (describing the inability of Non-Annex I countries to participate in
the trading of technology permitted by Annex I countries).
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different proposals from States Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The
section devoted to the scope of this document stresses that some of its
annexes (I to IV) "cover only those proposals which Parties consider
would not trigger amendments to the Kyoto Protocol." 237
Annex III includes, however, some proposals that would
significantly modify the commitments undertaken by developed
countries under the Kyoto Protocol in response to new scientific
evidence provided in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report. Thus, a
COP decision proposal in connection with greenhouse gases, sectors,
and source categories seeks to reaffirm that "the actual emissions of
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride,
including new species identified by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change in its Fourth Assessment Report, should be
estimated, where data are available, and used for the reporting of
emissions."2 38 Another COP decision proposal in Annex III states the
following:
[The COP] [d]ecides that for the purposes of this agreement, the global
warming potentials used to calculate the carbon dioxide equivalence of
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of
greenhouse gases listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol shall be those
provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its
Fourth Assessment Report based on the effects of the greenhouse gases
over a 100-year time horizon. Any revision to a global warming
potential by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
subsequent to the Fourth Assessment Report or revisions of the
approach used to calculate carbon dioxide equivalence shall apply only
to commitments under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol in respect of any
239
commitment period adopted subsequent to that revision.

Such proposals are interesting for our purpose because they illustrate
how the COP and/or the Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,
could proceed, through its law-making powers, to a scientific updating
of the regime rules to take into account new evidence.
4.

Reparation

The applicability of the concept of reparation to the international
regulation of climate change requires some preliminary clarifications.
In the current state of the international CCR, the focus is clearly on
prevention (through mitigation and compliance) rather than on
reparation. There is, of course, an important component of reparation
in the adaptation strategies contemplated by the CCR, but such
component cannot easily be equated with the ordinary concept of

237.
238.
239.
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Id. Annex III.
Id.
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reparation in general international law, as it is reflected by Article 34
of the ILC Articles. This provision contemplates three different forms
of reparation, namely restitution, compensation and satisfaction.
Only the first two forms are relevant for our discussion. Indeed, the
victims of a violation of a rule potentially covering climate change
issues (e.g., the principle sic utero tuo ut alienum non laedas, norms
protecting cultural heritage and indigenous or other human rights)
may bring an action to request that the situation preceding the
violation be reestablished or that any damages suffered be
compensated. 240 There are many cases (mainly at the domestic level)
where claims connected with climate change have been pursued in
such a manner. 24 1 This has come to be known as "climate change
litigation."24 2
240.
This principle underlies Principle 21 of the Stockholm Convention, supra
note 41, and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration,supra note 39, and has been considered
by the International Court of Justice to be part of general international law, see
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
241 (July 8) (assessing the legality of the threat or the use of nuclear weapons under
international law). The principle was argued, with reference, inter alia, to the findings
of the American Court of Human Rights, in the Awas Tingni case. See Inuit

Circumpolar Conference, Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights
Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and
Omissions of the United States, at 70 (2005), available at http://www.earthjustice.org/
library/legal docs/petition-to-the-inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-on-behalfof-the-inuit-circumpolar-conference.pdf (noting that Awas Tingni court interpreted
property rights under the American Convention as those rights "understood by the
indigenous community involved'). The World Heritage Committee has received several
petitions raising the issue of the impact of climate change on the deterioration of
certain World Heritage Sites (the Sagarmatha National Park in Nepal, Australia's
Great Barrier Reef, and the city of Venice in Italy) protected by the UNESCO World
Heritage Convention of November 16, 1972, United Nations Convention Concerning
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 1037
U.N.T.S. 151. In response, UNESCO developed several reports and policy documents,
including, for example, U.N. Educ., Sci. & Cultural Org., Policy Document on the
Impacts of Climate Change on World Heritage Properties (2008), available at
http://whc.unesco.org/uploads/activities/documents/activity-393-2.pdf, and U.N. Educ.,
Sci. & Cultural Org., Strategy to Assist States Parties to Implement Appropriate
Management Responses
(July
2006),
available at
http://whc.unesco.org/
uploads/news/documents/news-262-2.doc.
241.
See Shi-Ling Hsu, A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation
Through the Lens of a Hypothetical Lawsuit, 79 CONN. L. REV. 700, 708-15 (2008). ShiLing Hsu identifies three main categories of actions: (1) actions against governmental
entities for acts or omissions relating to greenhouse gas emissions (this category
includes, inter alia, the well-known cases Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007),
before the United States Supreme Court, and the petition filed by the Inuit
Circumpolar Conference against the United States before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 240); (2)
actions against governmental entities to force procedural consideration of global
climate change impacts (this category includes several domestic suits brought against
regulatory agencies in the United States, Germany, Australia and New Zealand); (3)
civil lawsuits against private entities directly responsible for greenhouse gas emissions
(this category includes, inter alia, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir.
2009), an important class action brought by victims of Hurricane Katrina against oil
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Climate change litigation presents its practitioners with several
challenges closely related to the specificities of the global warming
phenomenon. From evidentiary rules to substantive issues of liability
and causation, the difficulties involved in climate change litigation
are largely dependent upon the complexity of the scientific processes
linking (1) the emissions of a particular state, industry or company,
and (2) global warming and the damage allegedly suffered or about to
be suffered by the claimants. The following is a discussion of these
two difficulties in the light of a number of examples.
Shi-Ling Hsu makes reference to different hypotheses. One
would involve an action against major polluters (states or companies)
by Tuvalu or another small island threatened in its existence by
rising sea levels caused by climate change. The plausibility of such a
hypothesis was confirmed in 2002, when Tuvalu actually raised the
possibility of bringing an action against Australia and the United
States on such grounds. 243 Another hypothesis would be an action by
the Inuit people against either the United States or polluting
companies. Again, this hypothesis is far from representing an
academic exercise, as evidenced by the petition filed in December
2006 by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference against the United States
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Hsu
focuses, however, on an action brought by the Inuit people against
electricity companies on the bases of the common law tort of
nuisance. For the purposes of this analysis, these hypotheses are
useful because they show the scientific challenges that must be
overcome for climate change litigation to become a regular cause of
action.
The first and perhaps most important challenge is that of
establishing causation.
There are millions of sources of GHG
emissions and the ties between each one of them and global warming
and its effects are virtually impossible to circumscribe. This is
typically why expert reports would not as such be sufficient in the
absence of a legal theory capable of bridging the gap between
correlation and causation. The Inuit Petition stresses the correlation
between the United States estimated historical emissions and thirty
percent of the observed temperature increase of approximately 0.60

and gas companies, electric utilities, and other companies in the United States). Hsu,
supra,at 708-15.
242.
See
ADJUDICATING
CLIMATE
CHANGE:
STATE,
NATIONAL
AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009)

(providing an overview of this emerging field).

243.

See Kalinga Seneviratne, Tuvalu Steps up Threat to Sue Australia, US,

2002,
http://www.tuvaluislands.com/news/archived/2002/2002-09-10.htm
Sept. 8,
(describing the efforts of Tuvalu to initiate a World Court lawsuit against the United
States and Australia).
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Celsius degrees in the period from 1850 and 2000.244 The petitioner
acknowledges, however, that "the actual correlation between
cumulative emissions and temperature increase is subject to some
uncertainty." 245 And even if it were not, the causation theories used
in general international law are admittedly not adapted to substitute
correlation for causation. This is, therefore, a matter of law and
policy, rather than a pure scientific issue, at least under the current
understanding of the climate system as it arises from the IPCC
Fourth Assessment Report. To make this point clearer one may refer
to the thought experiment developed by Ronald Dworkin to illustrate
the role of policy considerations in adjudication. Dworkin describes an
imaginary case, that of Mrs. Sorenson:
Mrs. Sorenson suffered from rheumatoid arthritis and for many years
took a generic drug-inventum-to relieve her suffering. During that
period inventum was manufactured and marketed under different trade
names by eleven different pharmaceutical companies. In fact the drug
had serious and undisclosed side-effects, of which the manufacturers
should have known, and Mrs. Sorenson suffered permanent cardiac
damage from taking it. She was unable to prove which manufacturer's
pills ... had actually injured her. She sued all the drug companies who
had manufactured inventum, together, and her lawyers argued that
each of them was liable to her in proportion to its share of the market
in the drug over the years of her treatment. The drug companies replied
that the plaintiffs request was entirely novel and contradicted the longestablished premise of tort law that no one is liable for injury he has
not been shown to have caused. They said that since Mrs. Sorenson
could not show that any particular defendant had injured her or even
manufactured any of the inventum she took, she could recover against
246
none of them.

Dworkin's example is particularly apposite for the analysis of climate
change litigation. First, one could without much difficulty substitute
the Inuit people or Tuvalu for Mrs. Sorenson and the major historic
polluters (either states or companies) for the drug manufacturers in
this example. As in the Sorenson case, it cannot be determined whose
emissions (drug) actually caused the damage (cardiac dysfunctions).
What is clear is that emitters (drug companies) should have known,
at least since the 1980s based on precautionary reasoning, that their
activities had an impact on climate (undisclosed side effects of
Second, the solution to the dilemma raised by the
inventum).
Sorenson case or in climate change litigation must be rooted not in
scientific certainty (for instance, through an expertise that would be
capable of distinguishing among the different types of inventum
manufactured by different companies and then link one of these to
the Mrs. Sorenson's cardiac dysfunctions) but in policy and law

244.
245.
246.

Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 240, 68-69.
Id. at 69.
RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 143 (2006).
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capable of dealing with scientific uncertainty. In Dworkin's view, the
adjudicatory body faced with such a case should "try to identify
general principles that underlie and justify the settled law of product
liability, and then apply those principles to this case."2 47 It may
conclude that the drug companies are right or, rather, that Mrs.
Sorenson is right, mainly on the basis of a policy assessment. The
trouble with climate change litigation is that there does not seem to
be a "settled law of climate change" the underlying principles of
which could be sought. Most climate change litigation is based on
specific statutes and common law theories, such as nuisance, which
may deal with such a causation problem. 24 8 But the question
remains open in international law. 249 This said, despite states'
general reluctance towards international rules imposing strict
liability on them, the climate change litigation risks at the level of
private operators is becoming increasingly recognized. 250
A second challenge that would have to be overcome for climate
change litigation to become fully operational concerns the link
between global warming and the damage claimed. Here, scientific
expertise is critical. The impact of an overall increase in temperature
would not be equally visible in every part of the world. That was a
major point made in the Inuit Petition. In an interview given in
connection with her appearance before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the former chair of the Inuit
Circumpolar Conference declared that
[the commission] wanted to hear the legal aspects, the broader issues of
the connection between human rights and climate change, so we were
able to testify on the broader larger picture of climate change and
human rights, not just for Inuit but for vulnerable peoples of the world .
. . . Most people have not made that connection and I think unless
you're living in that situation where you see that automatic connection

247.
Id.
248.
Id. at 283 (citing Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924, 935-38 (Cal. 1980));
see also Hsu, supra note 241, at 749-51 (discussing Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151
(7th Cir. 1979), vacated, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., 495
F.2d 213, 215 (6th Cir. 1974); O'Connor v. Raymark Indus., 518 N.E.2d 510, 513 (Mass.
1988); Warren v. Parkhurst, 92 N.Y.S. 725 (1904); Lockwood v. Lawrence, 77 Me. 297
(Me. 1885); Harley v. Merrill Brick Co., 48 N.W. 1000 (Iowa 1891); California v. Gold
Run Ditch & Mining, 4 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1884); Woodyear v. Shaefer, 57 Md. 1, 3 (1881)).
249.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of
facilitated liability in international law).
250.
See, e.g., KEVIN L. DORAN ET AL., RECLAIMING TRANSPARENCY IN A
CHANGING CLIMATE: TRENDS IN CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE BY THE S&P 500 FROM 1995
TO THE PRESENT (2009) (discussing climate risk disclosure requrements and arguing for
SEC interverntion to ensure accurate information); BETH YOUNG ET AL., THE CORP.
LIBRARY, CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS (2009) (outlining the current state
of climate risk disclosure and analyzes the extent to which compliance with disclosure
requirements takes place).
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of an erosion or a destruction of your way of life it's hard to see that
2 51
connection."

The Inuit Petition was supported by the findings of several scientific
reports, 252 including the 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment,
prepared by more than three hundred scientists from fifteen
countries and six indigenous peoples' organizations. 253 The InterAmerican Commission did not take position on the merits of the Inuit
Petition. 25 4 It is therefore unclear whether the scientific evidence
currently available on the impact of global warming on the Arctic
environment would be sufficient for litigation purposes before an
international tribunal. Given the considerable uncertainty regarding
the anticipated rise of the sea level, it is also unclear the extent to
which small island nations would be capable of establishing a
prejudice before an international tribunal.
In light of these and other challenges, climate change litigation
may admittedly not be an entirely satisfactory regulatory approach to
scientific uncertainty in climate change issues. 255 It has the merit of
making the urgent need for such regulation more concrete, however,
and to foster what is perhaps one of the most promising avenues for
the implementation of IEL, namely decentralized enforcement.

V. CONCLUSION
Throughout the years, international environmental regimes have
developed several techniques to deal with the scientific uncertainty
that often characterizes their objects of regulation. Those identified
in this study are some of the most significant ones, but there may be
others. Giving a complete picture of such techniques is particularly
difficult because (1) the same techniques may operate in different
manners depending on the stage of regime development where they
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253.
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available at http://www.acia.uaf.edulpages/scientific.html
information on the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment).
Andrew C. Revkin, Inuit Climate Change PetitionRejected, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
254.
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/16/worldlamericas/16briefs-inuitcomplaint.html. But
see H.R.C. Res. 10/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRCIRES/10/4 (Mar. 31, 2009) (adopting a position on the
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intervene (e.g., the precautionary principle as an advocacy tool or as
an argument for shifting the burden of proof), and (2) many of these
techniques have different functions within an environmental regime,
so one cannot exclude that a technique so far used for another
unrelated purpose may at some point be mobilized to deal with
scientific uncertainty (an example of such a general purpose
technique is law-making by treaty bodies).
The effect of scientific uncertainty on the emergence and
development of a regime is seldom a simple issue of scientific
relevance. Different scientific views of an environmental issue are
favored, and sometimes even fostered, by competing interest groups.
States are also led to take position on such issues on the basis of both
scientific
evidence
and
other
socio-economic
or
strategic
considerations. To be effective or, at the very least, to remain
relevant, international environmental regimes must tackle these
daunting challenges. The techniques this Article has surveyed help
face such challenges, with varying degrees of success from one regime
to the other and over time. The following paragraphs briefly
summarize what the Author views as the basic conceptual findings of
this study.
At the advocacy stage, when the difference between uncertainty
and risk is not yet entirely clear, precautionary reasoning plays an
important role in pushing advocacy efforts forward. The effect of
precautionary reasoning seems to be a function of the public
perception of the risks, even when such perception is not entirely
supported by scientific evidence. The adoption of the Biosafety
Protocol illustrates this hypothesis, as an extension of the
biodiversity regime. Conversely, it may happen that the public has
difficulty understanding the need and urgency of taking action with
respect to an environmental issue despite the growing scientific
evidence pointing in this direction, as illustrated by the emergence of
the climate change regime.
The path leading to the emergence of a regime is often reflected
in the subsequent design of its basic architecture. The specific
balance between procedural and substantive contents in the founding
instrument of a regime seems to be the key in this respect. The
Vienna Ozone Convention was adopted before major scientific
breakthroughs showed the need and urgency to regulate ozone
depleting substances. As a result, it had little substantive content,
but it laid solid foundations for a framework-protocol approach that
would enable the regime to react to subsequent scientific discovery, as
was the case of the Montreal Protocol and its subsequent
amendments and adjustments. By contrast, the design phase of the
UNFCCC shows a different balance between procedural and
substantive components, which can be explained by the considerable
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advance in the understanding of climate change processes catalyzed

by the work of the IPCC.
Design features are naturally critical for the subsequent
Thus, substantive
implementation of an environmental regime.
decision making by treaty bodies is important for specifying and
expanding the scope of the obligations undertaken by states in
response to scientific developments, as illustrated by the adjustment
of the ozone depleting potentials contemplated by the Montreal
Protocol or by the initiative taken by the COP of the POP Convention
to include nine new chemicals in the list of controlled substances.
This latter example also shows the role of scientific advisory bodies
created at the design stage. Indeed, the initiative of the POP
Convention's COP followed the updating of the risk profile of those
nine chemicals by the POP scientific advisory body.
The need to deal with scientific uncertainty has also led states to
recognize that a regime cannot simply impose obligations and expect
its participants to comply but may also have to provide assistance for
states to manage the scientific and technological challenges raised by
such compliance. Managerial approaches to compliance, including
non-compliance procedures and technical or financial assistance,
recognize that at least part of the problem is that some states do not
have the resources to understand or manage the risks associated
with, for instance, chemicals or hazardous wastes. This is also the
starting point of other techniques such as prior informed consent or
environmental impact assessment, which seek to ensure that states
have at least the basic information necessary to know what they are
doing when dealing with dangerous substances or activities.
Most of the techniques used in environmental regimes to handle
scientific uncertainty are aimed at preventing environmental
damage. However, scientific uncertainty also raises many challenges
when such damage has occurred or is imminent, and the victims seek
reparation. This is mainly because environmental damage requires
complex evidentiary procedures and, even when such procedures are
managed effectively, the scientific processes that must be established
are often too difficult or indirect to fall within the scope of the
traditional legal concepts of causation, damage, or liability. This is
why in some cases, environmental regimes provide for facilitated
liability (as in the fields of marine pollution and nuclear activities) or
adjusted evidentiary rules (as in the PCA Optional Rules).
The extrapolation of at least some of these techniques to other
fields of international law where scientific uncertainty is recurrent
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. However, the possibility
that a burgeoning field of international law such as IEL may
contribute its techniques to its elders constitutes additional evidence
that IEL has now reached maturity.
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